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DEAD HAND ARGUMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Adam M. Samaha*
This Article attempts to reset the relationship between theories of constitutional authority and methods of constitutional interpretation. Several
scholars assert that our reasonsfor respectingthe United States Constitution
as law-despite its imperfection and dead authors-strongly influence the
propermethod of interpretationfor that text. The "why" of authority supposedly drives the "how" of interpretation. But this relationship can be better
understood. To the extent an authority theory is distinguishablefrom interpretive method, it is true that the former will identify what counts as law to
be interpreted. Beyond that, the asserted relationshipfades. First, some authority theories actually depend on a given interpretive method rather than
the reverse, and an overarching normative framework can independently
suggest interpretive choices. Second, and oddly, the correlation between a
constitutional authority theory's persuasiveness and its logical implications
for interpretationseems negative. Perhaps the more persuasive, the less influential. This is so even putting aside institutionalconsiderations, which already have been used to soften the influence of high theory on interpretation.
Yet authority theories and interpretationmay be connected in a different way.
The link involves multiple sources of law, instead of the interpretive method
for one text. An authority theory can gauge the relative strength of competing
sources of law bearing on the same decision, helping to resolve conflicts
among them. Even the Constitution is subject to an evaluation of its
strength.
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For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of
itself incapable of and not in need of
the constitutional text is
1
further demonstration.
We can determine the method to interpret the Constitution
first clear about why the Constitution is
only if we are
2
authoritative.
INTRODUCTION

Not long ago, the National Archives Building was refurbished at a
cost of over one hundred million dollars. 3 Part of this investment went to
preserve the "Charters of Freedom": original parchment versions of the
United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of
Independence. Those documents were not always well-kept. For thirtyfive years, the Declaration was displayed on a wall of the Patent Office
bathed with direct sunlight. 4 By 1952, however, the parchments were
placed in ultraviolet-filtered encasements with helium and a little water
vapor. Conservators in the 1990s detected deterioration of interior glass
1. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 384 (1981)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Monaghan, Perfect Constitution].
2. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1127, 1128 (1998).
3. See Lisa Rauschart, Founding Documents Resonate at Archives, Wash. Times, Sept.
11, 2003, at M14; Linda Wheeler, 225 Years of History Going on Hiatus, Wash. Post, July 1,
2001, at C1.
4. See Verner Clapp, The Declaration of Independence: A Case Study in
Preservation, 62 Special Libr. 503, 503 (1971).
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panes and possible helium leaks. So engineers developed new encasements with gold-plated titanium frames, a humidified argon gas filling,
and a system for imaging the documents and measuring their atmosphere. 5 The Charters now rest in these encasements. Every morning
telescoping robotic arms slide the parchments into the rotunda of the
Archives for public viewing, and every evening the documents are re6
turned to bomb-proof vaults for safe keeping.
This might seem extravagant. But the maintenance of cultural icons
is a logical preoccupation of government. Icons may perpetuate a sense
of common mission that can be useful in maintaining order and implementing policy. 7 True, our understanding of iconography is not always
adequate to explain why any one bit of cultural material becomes salient.
Why not encase the Reconstruction Amendments, or the Nineteenth
Amendment, or Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, or Reagan's Executive Order
on cost/benefit analysis? These are ancillary questions, however. The
practice of national symbolism is everywhere and persistent, extending to
flags, colors, statuary, pledges, anthems, oaths, and occasionally human
remains.8 That the Constitution has become an honored relic is not particularly strange. 9
Somewhat more mysterious is the Constitution's status as enforceable law. It is not even the most popular document in the rotunda. This
distinction belongs to the Declaration, which mainstream lawyers today
consider rhetoric outside the scope of positive law. In fact, the careful
treatment of the Constitution at the National Archives is a reminder
about texts. Words, including positive law, do nothing without assistance.
Declaring that "the Constitution requires" something is either shorthand,
false modesty, or misdirection. Nor is it completely obvious, to many academics anyway, why we choose to perpetuate the federal constitutional
text as law. 10

5. See Rauschart, supra note 3; Wheeler, supra note 3; Nova: Saving the National
Treasures (PBS television broadcast Feb. 15, 2005), transcript available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3206_charters.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
6. See Ann Longmore-Etheridge, The Healthy Constitution of Document Security,
Security Mgmt., Oct. 2003, at 26, 26.
7. See Sanford Levinson, The Tutelary State: "Censorship," "Silencing," and the
"Practices of Cultural Regulation," in Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural
Regulation 195, 197-99 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998).
8. See Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence,
at xiii (1997) (comparing Charters to Lenin's embalmed corpse displayed in Moscow
mausoleum).
9. Cf. Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 1294, 1298
(1937) (noting role of symbol in "cementing internal order").
10. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living
Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1749-50 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, Living
Constitution] (arguing that document does not reflect modem nationalistic values).
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The question of the Constitution's authority across generations rests
within a division of constitutional theory." The challenge is to answer
the complaint that following an ancient constitution amounts to dead
generations governing the living. This dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is feasible for the living to depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation participated in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the
Constitution is otherwise imperfect for our time. 12 Of course, similar
complaints can be lodged against all sorts of arrangements that persist
beyond one generation of decisionmakers, including dated statutes, regulations,judicial precedent, wills, and perpetual trusts. It is hard to believe
that all of them are illegitimate. But perhaps the Constitution is distinctive. Key provisions are exceptionally old, the text's formal amendment
process is difficult to complete successfully under present conditions, and
the text describes a government system with nationwide and international
impact. No other source of law shares this combination of features, not
even state or foreign constitutions.
However intriguing, dead hand arguments about the Constitution
might be purely academic. Our legal culture now firmly accepts the constitutional text as law without indication of softening in the future. Government officials risk heavy reputational hits if not job loss for publicly
suggesting the text should be ignored-although predicting the response
to such suggestions is tricky because no one ever makes them. The best

11. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 16-17 (1962) (focusing on judicial review);Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement 268 (1999) [hereinafter Waldron, Law and Disagreement] (challenging
precommitment models); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013, 1045-46 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering]
(recognizing intertemporal difficulty); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox
of Democracy, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 195, 195, 199-221 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988) (reviewing founding era dead hand complaints); Joseph Raz, On the
Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in Constitutionalism:

Philosophical Foundations 152, 164-69 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) [hereinafter Raz,
Authority and Interpretation] (discussing authority of old law).
12. See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 167-71 (1990) (rejecting such
claims); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 11 (1980)
(raising such claims); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 225 (1980)

[hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest] (pressing such

claims); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 381 (1997) (endorsing
such claims); infra Part I.B.2; see also McConnell, supra note 2, at 1127 ("The first
question any advocate of constitutionalism must answer is why Americans of today should
be bound by the decisions of people some 212 years ago."); David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717, 1717, 1725, 1731-32
(2003) [hereinafter Strauss, Jefferson's Principle] (arguing that Constitution can provide
focal point despite its age); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 880 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] (noting puzzles
created by fidelity to Founders' decisions).
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course might be to recognize an impressive overlapping consensus, ac13
cept the Constitution's authority as axiomatic, and move on.
Against this possibility, several scholars have indicated a practical
need to know the rationale for the text's status as enforceable law. They
assert that theories of authority are logically connected to methods of
interpretation, and in a particular way: The former drive the latter. One
cannot decide whether to use some form of originalism or moral inquiry
or common-law reasoning or any other method of interpretation, the argument goes, without knowing why the subject of interpretation counts as
law. Michael McConnell asserts that "our answer to the 'why' question
has implications for the 'how' question. We can determine the method
to interpret the Constitution only if we are first clear about why the
Constitution is authoritative."1 4 There are different versions of this view,
but the basic idea is that an interpretive method ought to flow from a
sound theory of authority for the Constitution. If so, it is imperative to
evaluate competing theories of the text's authority despite any rock-solid
overlapping consensus that the text must be law. Constitutional interpretation is an ongoing necessity, and the assertion is that an authority theory will drive that practice.
This authority/interpretation relationship has been asserted for both
statutes and constitutions, and there is something to it. Authority theories identify what counts as law, and so they generate targets for interpretation. Furthermore, if an official should respect a text just because a
higher power issued it, then the official could sensibly decide to resolve
ambiguities according to the higher power's ascertainable intent or expectation or interest. Consider James Madison's logic. In 1824, he preferred to consult the ratifying generation of which he was a part: "[T] he
guide in expounding the Constitution" ought to be "the sense in which
the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense
alone it is the legitimate Constitution."'15 But this type of social contractarianism is not the only authority theory that has been connected to
an interpretive method. Scholars who believe our Constitution's authority turns on its adequately good content, or its coordination of human
behavior, or even its potential to destabilize political victories have
as16
serted that these theories strongly influence interpretive method.
In this Article, I test the assertion that authority drives interpretation.
My claim is that the relationship between authority theories and interpre13. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 23 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Tribe, Constitutional Law] (doing so after framing arguments); Monaghan,
Perfect Constitution, supra note 1, at 383-84 (similar).
14. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1128.
15. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in 9 The
Writings of James Madison 190, 191-92 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). Madison later
suggested that subsequent legislative practice is crucial to meaning. See Letter from James
Madison to CharlesJ. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of James
Madison 183, 184-86 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1867).
16. See infra Part II.C (collecting sources).
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tive method has been misunderstood. Any generic assertion that a theory
of the Constitution's authority drives its interpretation has the relationship partly backward and importantly wrong. 17 Crucially, I make this
claim while attempting to bracket issues of institutional choice and design, which already have been used to question the usefulness of high
theory. 18 These issues are vital, and I return to them in the closing pages.
But my core argument will not depend on theorists becoming empiricists,
or the possibility that data or uncertainty about the consequences of various interpretive choices will produce a peaceful overlapping consensus.
My argument tests the asserted relationship between authority and interpretation on its own terms, setting aside orthogonal attacks based on institutional and empirical factors.
The asserted relationship turns out to be problematic in two allied
ways. First, the supposed unidirectional influence of authority theories
on interpretive method does not always hold. Certain authority theories
depend on an interpretive method rather than the reverse. If one wants
to normatively judge a law's content, one cannot approach the text without some interpretive presuppositions, however minimal. Moreover, an
overarching normative framework can independently influence both interpretive method and authority theory. If so, any analytical sequence
from authority to interpretation begins to fade. Authority theories might
reflect a broader normative framework, but their mission is supposed to
be narrower: telling us what counts as enforceable law.
Second, and with respect to the Constitution, it is difficult to find any
authority theory that is both persuasive and logically connected to interpretive method. Indeed there might be a negative correlation between a
constitutional authority theory's persuasiveness and its practical implications for interpretation. This observation is based on controversial assessments, but it can be illustrated with prominent theories. For example,
contractarian theories based on ratification would point in an originalist
direction, if only these theories were now tenable for an ancient text. In
contrast, coordination theories provide plausible reasons to refer to the
17. I use "the Constitution" to refer only to text ratified per Articles VII and V. The
relationship to precedent is considered in Part II. I use "authority theory" as an umbrella
for many arguments about legal status, including but not limited to practical or theoretical

authority as defined in philosophy. If a text qualifies as a practical or theoretical authority,
there might well be implications for interpretative method. On philosophy's use of these
concepts, as well as "legitimacy" and "obligation," see infra Part II.A.
18. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy 4-5, 246 (1994) (arguing that policy goals are virtually
worthless without considering implementing institutions); Adrian Vermeule, Judging
Under Uncertainty 63-65, 254-59 (2006) [hereinafter Vermeule, Judging Under
Uncertainty] (explaining inadequacy of high theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 33-35 (1991)
(comparing judicial to legislative systems); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 2-4, 22 (1998) (stressing empirical knowledge); Cass R.
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636, 641-43
(1999) (stressing consequences).

HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 611 2008

612

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:606

text today despite its imperfection, but this conclusion actually has little
influence on interpretive choices.
The implications are several. First, the best interpretive method
might well vary over time. Contractarian theories might dictate originalism at first and then lose force. Second, other factors influencing interpretation have more power when authority theories drop out. Still to be
considered are decision costs and error costs, defined by a normative
framework and with regard to particular institutions. A third insight
pushes in another direction, toward the usefulness of theory: Authority
theories might be relevant to decisionmaking without instructing a decisionmaker how to interpret any particular text. Decisionmakers might
use authority theories to gauge the relative strength of competing sources of
law. If the Constitution is only weakly authoritative, we might recognize
other sources of supreme law-or instead level down all sources of law
toward what we now call "ordinary." Regardless, the connection between
authority theories, interpretive methods, and sound decisionmaking
ought to be reconsidered.
Part I explains the dead hand complaint in federal constitutional
law, to which theories of authority respond. It can be parsed into a descriptive claim about the ongoing social construction of law and different
types of normative objections. The discussion includes an analysis of
Article V as a potentially optimal outlet for constitutional change. Part II
elaborates the concept of an authority theory, tries to distinguish it from
interpretive method, and introduces the assertion that the former drives
the latter. Part III tests the connection between interpretation and various authority theories: (1) brute fact theories, meaning positivist dictates
of legal culture; (2) good content theories that rely on the excellence of
the text, the wisdom of the drafters, or the CondorcetJury Theorem; (3)
contractarian theories involving precommitment models and political incentives; (4) stability theories relating to coordination, self-enforcement,
and Burkean tradition; and (5) postmodern unsettlement theory. Part IV
collects lessons and speculates about why the asserted relationship
achieved a foothold in constitutional theory. Finally, a revised picture of
decisionmaking is suggested. It stresses additional factors: overarching
normative frameworks, pragmatic institutional considerations, and the
relative strength of competing sources of law.
In what follows, I assume that texts can be given meaning substantially bounded by an interpretive method. Radical versions of the indeterminacy thesis are set aside, positions that are hard to defend in any
event. 19 I also assume that a deductive relationship from theory to
method is possible. Perhaps these theories and methods must be the
product of induction or reflective equilibrium, but my argument will not
depend on this claim. Finally, I offer a caveat. An unbending commit19. See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 601, 621-22 (2006)
[hereinafter Samaha, Undue Process].
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ment held by some will prevent a decisive resolution of certain normative
questions. Heroic national origin stories are important to some audiences, for instance, and they are linked to certain authority theories involving deference to the judgment of historical figures. My sense is that
many of these narratives are mostly myth, even if useful myth. But if
others cannot agree, there is a persisting need for the rest of us to know
whether the asserted relationship to interpretive method holds true for
other classes of authority theories. It does not.
I. DEAD HAND ARGUMENTS

Skeptics might conclude that constitutional theory is a game you win
by not playing. The concern is that the theoretical arguments are often
empty-designed to produce favored outcomes in particular cases yet
promoted as ecumenical solutions to constitutional problems. This portrayal is probably too harsh; many scholars are working in good faith, and
attention to the concrete decisions of specific institutions is a perfectly
sensible preoccupation. But this Part suggests the reality is, in a sense,
worse than the skeptical view. Constitutional debate may escalate from
particular controversies to interpretive method and then to theories of
authority without resolving disputes or speaking to live questions. The
problem is not that dead hand complaints against the Constitution's authority are too partisan or incoherent; a plausible dead hand complaint is
restated below. The problem is that the Constitution's status as law might
be, for the time being, beyond our control.
A. From Interpretationto Authority
A familiar disagreement proceeds along these lines:
The Supreme Court decides a case such as Roe v. Wade 20 and observers are divided. One camp of scholars is elated with the intervention,
believing it comports with a sound moral vision that is at least permitted
by constitutional text. Ronald Dworkin's defense of abortion rights is illustrative. Affixing his position to the Constitution, Dworkin contends
that the document is not merely "a list of concrete, detailed remedies
drawn up by parsimonious draftsmen but a commitment to an abstract
ideal of just government. '21 Here, he is not openly advocating judicial
inquiry into justice unalloyed. He is making a claim about the drafters'
20. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
21. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 166 (1993); see also Sotirios A. Barber &James
E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 155-56 (2007) (proposing
"a fusion of constitutional law and moral philosophy"); Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government 40, 59-60 (2001) ("[W]e should interpret the
Constitution's ambiguous moral and political concepts as requiring Americans to exercise
their own best judgment."); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const.
Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (making originalist
case for abortion rights under Fourteenth Amendment by concentrating on high-level
principle rather than expected applications).
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semantic intentions. For certain constitutional provisions, Dworkin argues that a proper interpretation of what the text means requires readers
to work out abstract moral principles as best we now can, and without
regard to the particular conceptions or expectations of the drafters' generation. 22 The text might incorporate an abstract moral principle and,
correctly understood, that principle might yield an abortion right.
A second camp is distraught. They see the Court's decision as a manipulation of text and democracy-defeating-the exercise of excessive
power by unelected judges who have imposed their policy preferences on
the nation. In this spirit Robert Bork declared that "Roe, as the greatest
example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of democratic prerogatives in this century, should be overturned." 23 Bork denies that constitutional adjudication ought to be an exercise in moral reasoning and demands that courts abide by a version of originalism. 24 This interpretive
method, it is hoped, will constrain judicial policy discretion while bolstering adherence to the Constitution as written and ratified. Against the
first camp's commitment to moral outcomes, the second camp might advertise a form of democracy with less judicial policy making and more
fidelity to constitutional text.
In response, some reject the idea that constitutional law ought to
focus on promoting "democratic" outcomes, at least when enforced by
courts. 25 They might think private ordering is often too valuable to be

sacrificed. But regardless, the originalist camp is vulnerable to perceived
contradiction. A commitment to democratic choice may clash with textual fidelity. Those in the originalist camp often justify an institutional
choice away from the judiciary with a principle of democracy, yet their
best interpretation of constitutional text cannot invariably yield judicial
abstinence. Sometimes it will dictate aggressive judicial intervention
against modern-day legislation and executive preferences.2 6 This becomes apparent when attention moves from arguably ahistorical judicial
enforcement of abortion rights or gay rights and toward purportedly his22. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 120-23 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Justice]; cf. id. at 118, 122-23 (acknowledging that considerations of fit in adjudication
might contradict otherwise best interpretation of text).
23. Bork, supra note 12, at 116.
24. See id. at 144 ("All that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would
have been understood at the time."); see also Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 92 (2004) (dividing original public meaning
from original intent); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual
Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 34-37 (1999) (looking for evidence of
ratifiers' specific, clause-by-clause intent).
25. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 571-79 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, Accountability] (rejecting primacy
of majoritarian government); cf. Dworkin, Justice, supra note 22, at 133-34 (conditioning
democratic legitimacy on equal voice, equal stake, and private sphere of ethical
decisionmaking).
26. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 509, 515-23
(1996) (contrasting originalism with conventional readings and Burkean conservatism).
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torical restraints on Commerce Clause regulation or gun control, One
fresh target is Parkerv. District of Columbia.27 There the D.C. Circuit used
the Second Amendment's text and a Founding-era history of muskets and
militias to tell the District it may not ban home possession of functioning
28
handguns.
No consensus exists on which current practices are inconsistent with
originalism. But possible departures include much of the modern federal administrative state, most federal criminal law, all public school desegregation mandates, and all federal constitutional limits on sex discrimination by the state (beyond voting rights). Originalists cannot point to
contemporary democratic will as their polestar insofar as every version of
originalism chains outcomes to the decisions of past generationswhether "we" like it or not. "Everyone who voted for the Constitution is
long dead," Richard Posner observes, "and to be ruled by the dead hand
29
of the past is not self-government in any clear sense."
Yet the dead hand is a complication for both camps. Nonoriginalists
also try to show respect for an ancient constitutional text. If honest, this
respect will be constraining; interpretive flexibility is not endless. The
theorist who wants moral debate to take place during litigation must accept constraints on that debate according to the provisions of a morally
imperfect Constitution. Originalists are no better off. They must defend
a version of democracy less presentist than advertised. Each camp may
thus tweak the other for its fealty to an aged constitutional text, and the
alleged countermajoritarian difficulty for the judiciary becomes an intertemporal difficulty for everyone. 30 The remarkable part is when either
side suggests it has achieved an advantage by asserting a dead hand
3 1
problem.
The issue persists beyond moral readings and originalism. No reputable interpretive method avoids the dead hand issue because no reputa27. 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007). The case is pending before the Supreme Court as of this
writing.
28. See id. at 384-95. The legislation itself was thirty years old. On the difficult
interpretive questions, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
Yale L.J. 637, 643-57 (1989).
29. Richard Posner, The Problems ofJurisprudence 137-38 (1990); see also WilliamJ.
Brennan,Jr., Education and the Bill of Rights, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 219, 224 (1964) ("[T]he
genius of our Constitution resides not in any static meaning it may have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in its applicability and adaptability to current needs and problems.").
30. See Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 11, at 1045-46.
31. See Bork, supra note 12, at 170-71 (endorsing-in awkward fashion-form of
judicial originalism while claiming that nonoriginalists with dead hand complaints want
rule by judges rather than electorate); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383, 392 (2007) (indicating dead
hand is not problem for originalists because it is problem for text-bound nonoriginalists).
Ackerman's rendition of constitutional politics is actually similar; he counsels respect for
previous generations' non-Article V higher lawmaking. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Foundations 6-7, 81-99, 263-69, 316-19 (1991).
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ble method disregards constitutional text. For example, thematic readings of the Constitution attempt to discern a central message from the
32
document as a whole. Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty is a recent effort,
but the tradition was vibrant by the 1980s with scholars pushing themes
such as deliberative democracy and individual liberty. 33 Similar remarks
apply to Thayerian judicial deference to legislative judgment.3 4 Like thematic readings, which must presuppose some interpretive tools to find a
theme, deference is not a complete interpretive method. Strategies are
needed to ascertain when the Constitution is clear enough for the judiciary to intervene and how other institutions are supposed to resolve constitutional disputes. These questions remain related to an ancient text.
Larry Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism, which promotes
departmentalism for constitutional issues and relies on Founding-era history, 35 is not very different on this score. A dead hand complaint can be
softened to the extent that contemporary understandings of the text are
accorded weight and not cabined by inflexible interpretive requirements.
But the complaint cannot be ignored unless the text is no constraint on
popular meaning. A remaining interpretive school is more difficult to
assess. Common law constitutionalism is an evolutionary method focused
on precedent and tradition. It might be an alternative to text.3 6 But insofar as it incorporates respect for the Constitution, the remarks above
apply.
B. Dead Hand Complaints
In earlier ages, dead hand complaints could be taken more seriously
than rhetorical debater's points. American revolutionaries once spoke as
if they could "begin the world over again," 37 objecting to the perpetuation of bad practices or warning against attempts to lock in one path for
the future. They indicated a liberal democratic premise that living
32. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 6
(2004) (setting out to emphasize Constitution's supposedly "democratic objective").
33. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 12, at 76-77 (focusing on judicial review and
representation in politics); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 123 (1996) (arguing
from "the general commitment to deliberative democracy"); Brown, Accountability, supra
note 25, at 531-36 (suggesting government's "final cause is the protection of individual
rights"); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748-49 (1999)
(connecting multiple clauses of Constitution to generate meaning).
34. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 136, 144 (1893); accord Vermeule, Judging Under
Uncertainty, supra note 18, at 254-55 (summarizing Thayer's approach and present-day
variations on it).
35. See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 246-53 (2004).
36. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.4.
37. Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), reprinted in The Thomas Paine Reader
65, 109 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987); see also Stephen Holmes, Passions
and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy ch. 5 (1995) (reviewing Western
intellectual history of intergenerational constitutionalism).
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human beings are the proper subject of moral concern. It was also suggested that there was no choice but choice-that the dead could not possibly govern the living with positive law. In fact the dead hand complaint
in constitutional law is attributable to positivism and democratic values.
If the only possible authority were God's will, or immortal natural law, or
the King's fancy, or the everlasting German Nation, then law could not be
critiqued as a cross-generational artifact. But law and institutions are
human-made, the argument went, and they can be unmade once we see
fit to reform in light of new facts and values.
Thus Noah Webster lauded popular sovereignty and defended the
absence of a Bill of Rights in the 1787 Constitution. He argued that the
"attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption of a right to
control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate for those over
'38
whom we have as little authority as we have over a nation in Asia."
Webster conceded that many laws might "always be good and conformable to the sense of a nation," but held that "most institutions in society, by
reason of an unceasing change of circumstances, either become altogether improper or require amendment." 39 By 1789, Thomas Jefferson
was equally emphatic. He argued to Madison that, "by the law of nature,
'40
one generation is to another as one independent nation to another.
Hence, "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation." 4 1 The same
sentiment was expressed by Thomas Paine in his defense of the French
Revolution. Paine argued that past generations "have neither the right
nor the power" to control their posterity. 4 2 He derided Edmund Burke
for "referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to prove that the
rights of the living are lost" as " [t] he circumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men change also; and as
Government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only
'43
that has any right in it."
1. The Article V Outlet. - Still, there was no consensus on the proper
balance between stability and innovation during the Founding period.
Webster, Jefferson, and Paine supported ratification of the 1787
Constitution with its Article V amendment process, so a degree of formal
38. Noah Webster, On Bills of Rights, 1 Am. Mag. 13, 14 (1787) (emphasis omitted).
39. Id. Webster later lost his commitment to popular will in favor of a Christian social
order. See Richard M. Rollins, Words as Social Control: Noah Webster and the Creation
of the American Dictionary, 28 Am. Q. 415, 416-19 (1976).
40. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 The Works
of Thomas Jefferson 3, 8-9 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter Jefferson to Madison].
41. Id.; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in
12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 3, 11-14 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafterJefferson
to Kercheval] (asserting that "the dead have no rights").
42. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 12 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1791)
[hereinafter Paine, Rights of Man].
43. Id. at 16-17; see also Jack Fruchtman, Jr., Thomas Paine: Apostle of Freedom
229-32 (1994) (discussing book's reception in United States).
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entrenchment was acceptable to them on that occasion. Furthermore, if
the practice surrounding Article V amounts to the optimal method for
changing supreme constitutional law, then the dead hand complaint is
eviscerated. Any objection to this existing law would be appropriately
handled through that process.
Article V's optimality is, however, open to serious doubt. At a minimum we have good reason to be uncertain about the matter, 4considering
4
the difficult value choices and empirical questions involved.
Pressure to respect the Article V process is subject to at least four
rational objections: (1) It makes constitutional change too easy, (2) it
makes constitutional change too difficult, (3) it generates demand for
covert or otherwise troubling substitute methods of legal change, and (4)
it skews the distribution of amendment power in the wrong way.
The first concern might seem inconsistent with dead hand complaints about entrenchment. Yet perhaps a past generation created an
amendment process too lax for present exigencies, one that bends to the
excitement of reformers too easily, even if the number of Article V victories seems small at first glance. Stability in formal constitutional law has
comforting benefits. An analogue to this concern is the suggestion that
today's population ought to be shy about attempting Article V lawmaking.4 5 And some foreign constitutions exclude swaths of text from the
formal amendment process. 46 But because the federal amendment rate
47
is relatively low, Article V laxity is almost certainly not the leading worry.
The next two concerns are about stringency. The Article I, Section
7, process for legislation is arguably elaborate, but the formal amendment process is almost comically complex. Article V requires
supermajority votes in multiple institutions, and insulates equal state suffrage in the Senate absent the consent of each affected state. Facing such
hurdles, advocates of legal change may seek substitute methods.
They need not give up on supreme constitutional law, either. Past
generations accomplished serious change without formally amending, ex44. There is also the issue of precisely what Article V should be read to require and
permit. On judicial treatment and past practice concerning Article V, see Tribe,
Constitutional Law, supra note 13, § 1-19.
45. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, What's Wrong with Constitutional Amendments?, in
New Federalist Papers: Essays in Defense of the Constitution 61, 63-67 (Alan Brinkley et
al. eds., 1997). A contrary view is Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the
Constitutional Common Law, in The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in
the Constitutional State 229, 242-56 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
46. See, e.g., Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution]
art. 79(3) (Bundestag trans., 2000), available at http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs-e/
parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(exempting federalism and basic rights clauses from amendment).
47. See William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and
Amendability-A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1965, 1965-71 (2003)
(questioning net effect of constitutional obduracy).
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48
pressly disavowing, or obviously following the text of the Constitution.
Thus Article V's stringency is a potential explanation for creative judicial
"interpretation" of the text in a pinch, 49 and an impetus for theories that
validate sources of supreme law not reflected in an Article V victory. This
dynamic makes the formal endurance of constitutional text less important-even misleading-for those who wish to understand legal change
and the actual character of our constitutional system. Of course, equating a purported interpretation with a constitutional amendment requires
a contested choice for what qualifies as interpretation. 50 And some observers might be pleased with judicial power. 51 The simple thought remains that our mixture of informal and formal updating of constitutional
law and text is subject to fair objection.
The fourth concern works somewhat independently. It raises questions about the distribution of power to amend. Even if the rate of federal constitutional amendment is perfectly acceptable, there is the charge
that Article V is problematically skewed toward states as entities. Small
population states are likely to have more power in the Article V amendment process compared to, say, a national plebiscite or ordinary federal
statute making. Some believe that the Article V amendment process has
become discordant with a nationalizing culture and that the Constitution
will not include key contemporary values.5 2 The most entrenched textual
norm is equal representation in the Senate for every state, but no one
appears to believe this provision is the most central moral value in our
law. A related critique involves congressional power and self-dealing.
One might think that members of Congress, rather than the states, possess too much leverage over institutional reform that affects them. 5-' Per-

48. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 20-25 (1998)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Transformations] (describing non-Article V constitutional
moments); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 1457, 1458-64 (2001) (arguing that amendment has not been sufficient for change,
either).
49. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (relying on Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to oppose racial segregation in D.C. public schools);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (testing federal regulation by purportedly
substantial effect of its subject on interstate commerce); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457, 529-47, 553-54 (1871) (emphasizing exigency in upholding new paper
currency).
50. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 13,
25-36 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
51. Cf. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1958-60, 1968 (2003) (valuing judicial independence); Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 144, 174-76 (1996) (worrying about majoritarian threats).
52. See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 10, at 1749-51.
53. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amending Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 115
(1993) (worrying about efficient policy outcomes in Congress).
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haps some type of citizen initiative process, for all the hazards, would be
54
an improvement.
There always have been alternative models for constitutional change.
Jefferson himself vetted several: a flat sunset provision for any law after its
nineteenth birthday, 55 putting an expiring constitution to a majority popular vote, 56 or constitutional conventions whenever two of three branches
57
And
of government by two-thirds votes support textual alterations.
than
entrenched
Paine intimated that constitutions might be no more
statutes. He acknowledged that a law may properly extend across generapower to repeal, and for him "the
tions if the current generation retains
58
non-repealing passes for consent.
Indeed, history reveals little or no support for Article V as a model.
The voting rules for amendment of written constitutions in our states and
in foreign nations tend to be less demanding than Article V. In addition,
the frequency of amendment in these jurisdictions seems higher, even
59
though such victories are less resilient and thus arguably less valuable.
More dramatically, fourteen states have implemented one of Jefferson's
ideas for systematic instability. In these places the question whether to
hold a new state constitutional convention must be on the ballot periodically, such as every twenty years. 60 Between 1970 and 2000, this question
was posed twenty-six times and on four occasions enough voters answered
in the affirmative. 61 Lenient amendment procedures are not disastrous,
54. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 3; Or. Const. art. IV, § 1(2).
55. See Jefferson to Madison, supra note 40, at 6; cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl.3
(addressing initial state representation in the House); id. art. I, § 3, cl.2 (addressing initial
classification of senators); id. art. I, § 9, cl.I (setting localized sunset); id. art. V (same).
56. See Jefferson to Kercheval, supra note 41, at 12-14.
57. See Thomas Jefferson, Draught of a Fundamental Constitution for the
Commonwealth of Virginia (1783), in Notes on the State of Virginia 225, 236 (Richmond,
J.W. Randolph 1853).
58. Paine, Rights of Man, supra note 42, at 15; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Thomas Earle (Sept. 24, 1823), in 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 470, 471
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (noting convenience of "implied
assent").
59. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 355 (1994), reprinted in Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice
of Constitutional Amendment, supra note 50, at 237, 247-49 & tbl.1 (providing data on
state constitution amendment patterns between 1776-1991); Janice C. May, Amending
State Constitutions 1996-97, 30 Rutgers L.J. 1025, 1025 & n.6 (1999) (recounting
frequency and success of state amendment proposals);Janice C. May, State Constitutional
Developments in 2003, in 36 The Book of the States 3, 6 tbl.B (2004) [hereinafter May,
Developments] (listing amendment data for 1998-2003); Bjorn Erik Rasch & Roger D.
Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in Democratic
Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence 319, 332-35 (Roger D.
Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006) (discussing relationship between stringency
and amendment rates).
60. See, e.g., Ill. Const. art. 14, § 1 (b); May, Developments, supra note 59, at 4 (noting
that fourteen states have such requirements).
61. Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question
Referendum: The New York Experience in National Context, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 1017, 1044
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although surely some jurisdictions would be better off with greater formal
legal stability.
There are more imaginative alternatives as well. The Constitution
might have sunsetted Article V and converted the remainder to an ordinary statute after twenty years. Or it might have established, in lieu of
voting rules, a standard for departing from the text's meaning. We might
have asked whether fidelity to the text would be seriously contrary to our
present sense of public policy (which is basically how wills and perpetual
trusts are checked 62 ), or whether directives in the text are now unworkable and the subject of little reliance (as courts may do under the doctrine of stare decisis 63 ). In fact these standards might roughly track the
reality of informal change to our nominally supreme constitutional text.
None of this demonstrates intolerable flaws in the current system.
The issue is clouded with normative and empirical disputes. For example, relatively high textual amendment rates might be appropriate for the
states yet riskier at the national level; or an often-amended text might be
associated with more numerous and dangerous full-scale revisions. 64 As
well, credible commitments to particular legal forms have liberating upsides, which I return to below, while the hoped-for clarity of amendment
voting rules might beat amendment standards. Or it could be that formal
rules for amendment are much less important for amendment rates than
the degree of partisan competition. 65 Plus, different people have different tolerance levels for judicial updating, to the extent it acts as a substitute for the moral amendment process. But to say there is controversy
and uncertainty is not to endorse today's settlement, either.
2. Content of the Complaint. - If thoughts of Article V optimality can
be defeated with serious doubts or uncertainty, then a dead hand comtbl.I (2002). Each success was in a relatively small state: Hawaii, Rhode Island, and New
Hampshire (twice).
62. See Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 211-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(refusing to enforce testator's wish that her mansion be destroyed, considering neighbors'
property values); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 10.1
cmt. c (2003) (presenting nonexhaustive list of invalid conditions in wills); Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 29(c) & cmts. f & i (2003) (calling for balancing trusts' benefits with
"the effects of dead hand control").
63. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
64. See Lutz, supra note 59, at 247-52.
65. See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for
State Constitutions, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 62, 64, 74-75 (2005) (downplaying role of
formal amendment rules after accounting for influence of partisan political competition,
and claiming that civil law origins are related to higher state constitutional amendment
rates); see also Lutz, supra note 59, at 247-50 (suggesting that high amendment rates are
party product of longer constitutional documents covering more territory). On some of
the methodological choices involved in studying the relationship between formal
amendment rules and amendment rates, see generally Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure
Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives, 17 J. Theoretical Pol. 339
(2005).
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plaint has life. We can aggregate such complaints into a generic restatement that combines descriptive and normative claims: (1) The arrangement in question is socially constructed such that today's decisionmakers
may choose a new arrangement, and (2) a new arrangement is justified
because (a) today's decisionmakers have not adequately participated in
establishing or validating the existing arrangement and/or (b) the arrangement is otherwise imperfect according to some other normative
theory and in view of today's facts, values, or judgment. This combination, however intertwined, matches the structure of much normative argument: feasibility, process, substance.
The social construction claim is an assertion of present-day freedom
to choose. This was Paine's position. 66 The dead cannot literally govern
our choices, the complaint suggests, and so the living bear responsibility
for continuing or discarding old arrangements. This claim is importantly
true. Positive law is by definition socially constructed in a modest sense.
Without conceding that legal texts are boundlessly manipulable in accord
with the reader's preferences, it should be a point of consensus that living
human beings are responsible for creating and perpetuating positive law
and legal institutions. Anthony Kronman made this point eloquently by
connecting culture with law. 6 7 Both are perishable. Although one can
reject his further argument that the living generation is obligated to follow through on projects started in the past, 68 he is correct that some portion of law is defunct without affirmative effort from the living to abide
and transmit it to newcomers. In this policy space we may, but need not,
choose to follow the directives of a will or a trust or a statute or a constitution or any other document left over from the past.
Recognizing the mutability of legal norms does essentially nothing
on the normative side, however. Social construction observations may reveal options but the motive for change must come from norms. 69 Two
categories of normative objection to the status quo might be distinguished. The first is a process objection that those affected by an arrangement should have the opportunity to participate in its creation or
perpetuation. This might call for individualized consent, or majoritarian
democracy, or some other group decision rule; it could be animated by a
deontological respect for autonomy, or a communitarian demand for responsibility, or a consequentialist determination that the most accurate
judgments will be made by affected parties. These possibilities suggest
66. See Paine, Rights of Man, supra note 42, at 12.
67. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1053
(1990).
68. See id. at 1067-68 (making argument); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and

Insight, 103 Yale L.J. 177, 212-13 (1993) [hereinafter Brown, Tradition and Insight]
(critiquing argument).
69. See Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in Legal Hermeneutics:
History, Theory, and Practice 297, 314-16 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); Adam M. Samaha,
What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1251, 1253, 1281-85
(2007).
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different remedies. Jefferson's emphasis on prompting every generation
to reconsider legal arrangements indicates a communitarian vision, while
Paine's toleration of unrepealed law connects the participation objection
to actual shifts in popular preferences.7 0 In any case, the concern is with
repetition of past practices without contemporary validation. And nobody alive today participated in making any federal constitutional text
prior to the Sixteenth Amendment's ratification in 1913.
Dead hand critics usually have normative objections beyond participation. After all, the social construction claim threatens to explode the
participation objection. The former asserts current power over legal arrangements while the latter complains about a lack of present-day influence. Reconciling these positions demands a controversial theory of participation. As well, if a multigenerational arrangement is otherwise
perfect or unanimously considered optimal, then the dead hand argument is virtually over.
Charging the current order with imperfection may require another
easily contested normative standard, but serious complaints do exist. Perhaps the Constitution does not adequately reflect the need for executive
power in a setting where the United States government is a global actor
and rapid technological change makes legislation and judicial adjudication less reliable. Consider as well the fret that we lack a sensible plan for
71
governing in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist strike on the Capitol.
In addition, some egalitarians suggest the Constitution undercuts economic and other forms of equality,7 2 while populist democrats worry that
the text skews toward small rural states and an elite political class. 73 Less
ideologically charged critiques are also available.7 4 Regardless, dead
hand complaints usually will incorporate an attack on the content of legal
arrangements designed for, not just by, an earlier time. And the
Constitution might present a unique mark for dead hand criticism. Most
of the text is exceptionally old, the formal amendment process is uncommonly demanding, and the government it frames importantly influences
domestic society and the international order.
But perhaps a multigenerational arrangement is not categorically
special. Maybe a new generation of decisionmakers-if we can agree on
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
71. See James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis: An
Analysis of the Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1049, 1050-54 (2004)
(noting difficulty in repopulating House of Representatives).
72. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453, 453-58 (1992) (arguing that Bill of Rights
"perpetuate[s] women's subordinate status"); Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72
B.U. L. Rev. 765, 774-80 (1992) (emphasizing private hierarchies).
73. See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution 11, 24 (2006)
(recommending new constitutional convention); see also Robert Dahl, How Democratic Is
the American Constitution? 92-119, 168-69 tbl.5 (2001) (comparing policy performance
in other democracies).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 167-175.
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what that means-is unnecessary for the general complaint to apply.
Consider a colonial regime in which one nation dominates another territory for commercial gain. From the perspective of the colonial rulers,
this arrangement is contingent on their ongoing choices; from the perspective of the governed population, the arrangement may be unjustifiable because of insufficient popular validation or other moral principles
regarding subordination. It is hardly apparent that the situation is less
troubling than one generation's creating legal norms that are (taken as)
binding on the next. Dead hand arguments are a species of all arguments over appropriate decisionmakers. And they are less distressing to
the extent they assume the feasibility of change by affected parties. Truly
subordinated populations have no such choice.
Yet the attraction of dead hand complaints in the cross-generational
context could be just this message of freedom to depart. The complaint
is designed to achieve an energizing sense that there is no spirit world
dictating the continuation of ancient imperfection, that the maintenance
of law and institutions is contingent on the complicity of living decisionmakers, that these decisionmakers ought to justify the status quo
without assuming it is natural or necessary, and that the present might
well decide to respect new facts, values, and judgments. When the arrangement in question has lasted for multiple generations, moreover, the
sense of opportunity may interact with a concern that pastjudgments cannot possibly be optimal today. For some observers, this is true of the
Constitution. The original text was ratified for a population that was
comparatively tiny, crowded against the eastern seaboard, economically
backward, isolated by crude transportation and communications technology, tolerant of one human being owning others, wedded to narrow gender roles, religiously parochial, and little more than a bit player on the
world stage. 75 Formal amendments followed but they have not addressed
every plausible objection. The Article V procedure will almost certainly
remain difficult, while the instances and magnitude of regretful fidelity
will either remain stable or increase. The normative side of the dead
hand complaint therefore has a disconcerting, and possibly increasing,
76
attraction.

75. Cf. Klarman, supra note 12, at 381-87 (rejecting fidelity to Founders); Thurgood
Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1987) ("'We the People' no longer enslave, but the credit does not
belong to the framers.").
76. Some suggest the dead hand complaint against the Constitution ought to be
rejected because it proves too much,jeopardizing dated statutes,judicial precedent, and so
on. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: A Question of Time, or
Law?, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1112, 1115 (1998). Strong reasons exist for treating this
material as valid law, but pervasive applicability of the complaint is not an effective answer
to it. Maybe we have a systematic problem of slavish respect for antique law.
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C. An Invincible Constitutional Text?
But our legal reality is not so fluid. Actually the dead hand complaint against the Constitution is at least partly moot-and not because
the normative arguments are nonstarters. The problem is with the social
construction claim. As a technical matter, we are responsible for perpetuating older legal norms; as a practical matter, however, the opportunity
for departure is restricted.
Stickiness in positive law arises from multiple sources, some of which
academics are only beginning to model with any confidence. A well-recognized if not well-understood mechanism of friction is legal and popular
culture. Whether or not earlier generations hoped the document would
become invincible, 77 the Constitution is an icon and widely touted as enforceable law. Officials are still sworn to support "the Constitution" and
these officers and private parties refer to the text in countless disputes,
with some effect on arguments. Granted, popular knowledge of the document's content is limited and much of the text has an open-ended appearance. Furthermore, flat cultural explanations for ongoing phenomena are thin renderings of the dynamics that create patterned values and
behavior. But we need not be more clever if the goal is to know the
document's stature in popular and legal culture. It seems secure for now,
and surely more culturally entrenched than the pre-Civil War era. 78 To
the extent constitutional text is now encoded in culture, possibly nobody
has a meaningful short-run choice to repudiate it.
Second, multidisciplinary work on path dependence and process sequencing is inching toward a sophisticated understanding of lasting institutions. Roughly speaking, this work investigates the influence of prior
conditions and the order of events on subsequent outcomes, especially
where those past conditions and sequences were in some sense arbitrary
or suboptimal. Path dependence observations became popular in eco77. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 1 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison, supra note 15, at 503, 503-04 (arguing virtues of
stability and propriety of intergenerational respect); Philip A. Hamburger, The
Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 275-81 (1989)
(indicating that many at Founding hoped for indefinite Constitution); see also The
Federalist No. 49, at 314-16 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (objecting to
frequent conventions).
78. See Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American
Constitutional Theory 58-59 (1992) (arguing that, between 1790 and 1850, American
political identity shifted from state-creator to state-maintainer); Michael Kammen, A
Machine that Would Go of Itself 3 (1986) ("For almost two centuries, [the Constitution]
has been swathed in ... a fulsome rhetoric of reverence more than offset by the reality of
ignorance."); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism
and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1335, 1340,
1398-1405 (2006) (discussing relationship between American exceptionalism and public
reverence for Constitution); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 17 (1984) (discussing cultural investment in symbolic aspects of Constitution).
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nomic development studies some time ago, 79 and political scientists are
applying those lessons to government institutions. Paul Pierson, for example, investigates positive feedback mechanisms in politics that may perpetuate institutional rules, mobilization patterns, and thinking about
politics.80 Among the reasons for perpetuation are setup costs for an alternative system, learning effects from familiarity with the current system,
network effects from mass participation, and expectation adaptation as
institutional patterns appear stable.8 1
There is nothing irrational about these reasons for stability. Transition costs are real costs. True, path dependence is often used to unsettle
assumptions that competition and learning yield efficiency; 82 this accounts for vigorous debate over whether and what kind of path dependence is illustrated by the QWERTY keyboard arrangement.8 3 But we are
considering the stickiness of textual respect, not its desirability. And
while path dependence is relatively easy to identify when it comes to the
gene pool for the human species or the location of the U.S. Capitol
Building, it is a mistake to believe that culture, positive law, and institutions are more ephemeral as a rule. The Constitution is not only reflected in living institutions. Its status as a source of law involves an ongoing practice that might be self-reinforcing. Many have learned the
Constitution's terms and the practice of referring to text during debate
(or at least not clearly contradicting conventional readings of the text),
many expect this pattern of behavior to continue, and many may fear
79. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the
Economy 112-13 (1994); Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and
Economic Performance 93-100, 112, 137 (1990); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and
Economic Geography, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 483, 486-87, 497 (1991).
80. See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 10
(2004); see also Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 87, 88-89 (2006)
(categorizing different types of historical dependence). For a contrasting argument that
codified political institutions are often fluid in practice, see Gerard Alexander, Institutions,
Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation, 13 J. Theoretical Pol. 249, 251-52

(2001).
81. See Pierson, supra note 80, at 24 (following Arthur, supra note 79, at 112).
82. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Heroes, Herds and Hysteresis in Technological History:
Thomas Edison and 'The Battle of the Systems' Reconsidered, 1 Indus. & Corp. Change
129, 137-40 (1992) (discussing network technologies); MarkJ. Roe, Commentary, Chaos
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 641, 643-62 (1996)
(discussing general market evolution).
83. This is now the standard letter arrangement for personal computer keyboards in
the United States, although text messaging from cellular telephones illustrates a crack in
QWERTY dominance. Compare, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,
75 Am. Econ. Rev. 332, 333-36 (1985) (attributing its success for typewriters to path
dependence, and noting that arrangement allowed salesmen to type "typewriter" quickly
during demonstrations), with, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205, 206-08 (1995)
(distinguishing claims that t, decision was suboptimal over some time frame based on
whether better choice was feasibly recognizable at ti).
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the risks of attempting to recoordinate in a new equilibrium. The
Constitution might be law's version of a QWERTY keyboard.
Textual reference has become sufficiently patterned that it is worth
considering how much of the constitutional text would change if Article
V were eliminated and the document were amendable like an ordinary
statute. Quite possibly nothing, although unpopular Supreme Court interpretations of the text might be in jeopardy. This prediction is most
intuitive for matters of government structure. Around the world, shifts
between parliamentary and presidential systems are rare.8 4 Not one has
occurred in the U.S. at the state level, even though formal amendment
processes there seem less demanding than Article V. Equally striking are
the data on bicameralism. After the Court denied states the ability to
apportion legislative districts in ways substantially departing from equal
population,8 5 the rationale for state senates weakened. Yet not a single
state shifted to unicameralism in response. Only four states have tried
that structure in our history and only one still has it today.8 6 True, persistent structures might signify a locked-in political class. But the point is
that Article V-like procedures are not the only sources of constitutional
stability. Far from it.
So in some ways the status of the Constitution as law is a topic of no
importance. Culture and path dependence resolve the issue for now.
Debating the text's rightful authority might then be a theoretical parlor
game, with no obvious answer and no significance other than to provide a
gauge of how badly we should regret the past. Along these lines, Henry
Monaghan once concluded that the Constitution's authority is neither a
necessary nor a proper legal question:
The authoritative status of the written constitution is a legitimate matter of debate for political theorists interested in the
nature of political obligation. That status is, however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American constitutional law.... For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding
quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in
need of further demonstration. It is our master rule of
recognition. .... 87

II.

AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION

There are at least two practical reasons for continuing dead hand
arguments about the Constitution, even if there is no doubt about its
84. See Arend Lijphart, Democratization and Constitutional Choices in CzechoSlovakia, Hungary and Poland: 1989-1991, 4J. Theoretical Pol. 207, 208 (1992) (arguing
that changes to "the fundamental constitutional structure" are rare in established
democracies).
85. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571-77 (1964).
86. See Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal
Representation 259 (1965).

87. Monaghan, Perfect Constitution, supra note 1, at 383-84 (footnotes and emphasis
omitted).
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status as law. The first is a set of long-term concerns, which I will ignore.
Scrapping the document might become realistic in the future-the
Articles of Confederation did not last forever, while written constitutions
in other nations regularly disappear within a generation 8 8-and an ongoing inquiry into the text's value can make that future judgment better
informed. It could also combat a risky status quo bias. Dead hand debate
might produce the right mix of comfort and discomfort with the existing
order.
A second reason is more immediate. A group of theorists over the
last twenty years has asserted that a defensible method of textual interpretation cannot be constructed without knowing why the text in question is
law. Interpretation is an ongoing necessity. No thoughtful observer believes that uncertainty about the Constitution's meaning will be eliminated in the near term, or ever. Insofar as a persuasive theory of authority drives a justifiable method of interpretation, we are in need of the
former regardless of how certain we are that the Constitution counts as
law. This Part introduces the conceptual components of this thought.
A. Theories of Authority
In accord with relevant scholarship, 89 theories of authority should be
understood with a particular goal in mind. An authority theory is a test designed to ascertain what counts as enforceable or respect-worthy law. It is an if/
then proposition: If some test is satisfied, then the subject tested counts
as valid law or law worthy of someone's respect.
This testing function is not a commitment to find law in a given context, much less to create good law. These theories are supposed to be less
encumbered than that. An authority theory need not suggest what quantity of material should pass its test; an authority theorist might well prefer
less law to more, and her theory will function regardless of how much law
it finds. In addition, authority theories ought to be separated from general directives to "do good." Such directives might influence interpretation but they cannot be issued by an authority theory alone. If authority
theories become too bound up with normative commitments, they jeopardize one of their asserted goals-guiding the interpretation of law without descending to ground-level moral debates over abortion policy, gun
control, and the like. They need to be theories of the law rather than
simply theories of the good. And if they were the latter, any special role
for legal authority would be unclear. In this sense, advocates of the authority/interpretation relationship are trying to do more with less. 90
88. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written
Constitutions 1 (Dec. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law

Review) (estimating written national constitutions lasted seventeen years on average since
1789).
89. See infra Part II.C.
90. For their part, legal positivists might believe that normative evaluation of law will
be easier if we refuse to pass moral judgment on candidates for law at the validity stage.
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This restriction still leaves an array of options for authority theories.
The questions of law's definition and respect-worthiness have a massive
history of intricate logic and lasting disagreement within Western jurisprudence alone. Fortunately, present purposes call for only general
knowledge of the field, in part because constitutional theory has its own
set of standard arguments that imperfectly overlap with the teachings of
jurisprudence.
To be elementary, what we call law tends to include behavioral
norms in the form of commands backed by threat of force or softer encouragements, in addition to protocols for building institutions and fostering human collaboration. 9 1 The issue for an authority theory is law's
source or grounding. H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition and Hans
Kelsen's Grundnorm famously rely on official practice rather than normative justification to identify valid law. 92 Hart's ultimate rule of recognition sets the test of legal validity for all downstream rules, and it is identified by acceptance of the regime's officials and reflection in their
practices. 93 If officials accept and refer to the Constitution as a font of
94
valid law, that is the end of the analytical line on the text's legal validity.
There are competing views, of course. One might instead demand
that, before any norm can rightly qualify for the label of law, its content
must satisfy a basic normative test.95 A dispute over this requirement divides modern natural law theorists from legal positivists. 96 Perhaps truly
evil norms will gain respect if they are called law by theorists and others,
or maybe norms flunking a minimal test of goodness are too unstable to
warrant the label. Whatever the case, philosophy has subdivided the normative questions into law's legitimacy, law's authority, and the obligation
to obey law. Legitimacy involves the justifiable enforcement of a law or
legal system-a question aimed most directly at those who administer the
See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
597-98, 615-21 (1958) (applying this argument to Nazi law).
91. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the
Study of Jurisprudence 13-26 (1954) (stressing commands); cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept
of Law 26-49 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Hart, Concept of Law] (looking beyond orders
backed by threats).
92. See Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 91, at 56-57, 110-16; Hans Kelsen, General
Theory of Law and State 115-24 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961).
93. See Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 91, at 94-117 (describing necessary and
sufficient characteristics of legal systems).
94. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 621, 630-45 (1987) (comparing Constitution to Hartian rule of recognition); Raz,
Authority and Interpretation, supra note 11, at 161 (distinguishing national constitutions
from rules of recognition on which they rest).
95. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 57 (1984); cf. Lon

L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38-41 (rev. ed. 1969) (listing eight failures-such as
incomprehensible, contradictory, or retroactive rules-that "result[ ] in something not
properly called a legal system at all," while refraining from issuing more specific moral
requirements for law's content); id. at 205-06 (stressing law's ability to facilitate moral
objectives). One might also believe there can be no description of law without evaluation.
96. See Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 79-80 (4th ed. 2006).
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law.9 7 Authority inquiries ask whether the status of law can add a good
moral reason to believe (theoretical authority) or behave (practical authority) in accord with law.98 Obligation asks the affiliated question
whether a person subject to a behavioral norm has a moral reason to obey
simply because of the norm's status as law.9 9
The focus on moral reasons shows an interest in motives for respecting law other than the self-interested fear of sanction. A state trooper
might decide to enforce a speeding law, and a driver might decide to
travel more slowly because of that law, only because doing otherwise
would jeopardize the bank accounts of each. But many theorists want to
distinguish rightful authority or ethical action for social good from the
effective exercise of power or action in one's narrow self-interest. Unsurprisingly, inquiries into legitimacy, authority, and obligation demand
something more than fear as a test for respect-worthy law. Although
these questions can be answered in subtly distinct ways, the technical differences are not very important here. The concepts are certainly related, 10 0 and I include them all under the rubric of "authority theory." 10 1
Perhaps more useful is legal theory's notion of a content-independent reason. These are reasons that do not depend on a favorable judgment of law's content. 10 2 If such reasons exist, they can be effective in a
diverse society that ought to be held together. Persuasive even when a
law's substance is not, content-independent reasons may discourage exit,

97. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev.

1787, 1799 (2005).
98. See ScottJ. Shapiro, Authority, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and
Philosophy of Law 382, 382-85 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Oxford Handbook ofJurisprudence] (outlining responses to purported paradox that legal
authority "is either pernicious or otiose"); Vincent A. Wellman, Authority of Law, in A
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 573, 574-75 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996) [hereinafter Companion to Philosophy of Law] (describing theoretical and practical
authority).
99. See Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in The Authority of Law: Essays
on Law and Morality 233, 233, 245-49 (1979) (arguing against any moral obligation to
obey law based on its status as law); Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in Oxford
Handbook ofJurisprudence, supra note 98, at 514, 514-25 (differentiating legitimacy from
obligation).
100. For example, it seems clear that there is no independent moral obligation to
comply with an illegitimate system. A residual question is whether there is a moral
obligation to comply with a law that is legitimately enforced. See Kent Greenawalt,
Conflicts of Law and Morality 48-50 (1987); see also Leslie Green, The Authority of the
State 234-40 (1988) [hereinafter Green, Authority of the State] (probing whether absence
of political obligation entails that authority in question is illegitimate).
101. Philosophy's subdivisions do indicate a helpful point, however: What counts as
law depends on who wants to know. See infra Part III.A.1.
102. See H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in Essays on
Bentham 243, 254-61 (1982);Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 35 (1986) [hereinafter
Raz, Morality of Freedom].
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secession, and civil disobedience. Several have been suggested. 10 3 One
such reason is consent to the legal system by which the law was promulgated. Consent might be given normative weight apart from the law's
content, and the consent theme is part of an ideologically diverse history
of social contractarian theorizing,1 0 4 Somewhat similarly, appropriate hierarchical relationships can justify following the wishes of a superior.
Valid legal texts, such as statutes, are sometimes analogized to the command of a principal to subordinates, including courts. In addition, a person might offer epistemic deference to law. Following a law might produce morally desirable outcomes more often than fallible individual
evaluation. Furthermore, widespread acceptance of law can have coordination benefits that allow large numbers of people to achieve mutual
gains.1 05 Coordination justifications might work even if the outcome is
not ideal from each individual's perspective. One might even have a duty
to comply with an unjust law to help prop up an otherwise acceptable
10 6
legal system.
Each of these ideas has a role in constitutional theory. Normative
constitutional theorists explore the desirability of constitutionalism in various forms and across time, along with effective strategies for enforcement.1 0 7 The desirability issue leads to a proliferation of theories that
matches the variety of moral perspectives-utilitarian, egalitarian, libertarian, cosmopolitan, and so on. Furthermore, each moral framework
might apply differently in different contexts. Constitutionalism in the
United States might have to differ from constitutionalism in the United
Arab Emirates or the United Nations. And like legal theory more generally, constitutional theory encompasses content-dependent and contentindependent reasons for adherence to imperfect law. To keep the analy103. See Bix, supra note 96, at 167-71 (presenting "arguments [that] ...
the . ..

obligation to obey the law . ..

justify

based on consent, gratitude, reciprocity, and

consequences").
104. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 6-15
(1962) (following individualistic rational actor model); John Rawls, Political Liberalism
137, 217 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter Rawls, Political Liberalism] (asking what all
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse); cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
195-96, 206-07 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empire] (relying on associative
membership rather than consent).
105. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 12-18,
87-90, 97-98, 139-40 (1999) (characterizing successful constitutions as self-enforcing
conventions).
106. See generally George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation
37-40, 67-69 (1992) (discussing cooperation for presumptively beneficial public goods);
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 115 (1971) (asserting duty to support just institutions).
107. See Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 12 (2001) (identifying as "the most fundamental
questions about constitutional law" those of "why the Constitution ought to be obeyed and
whether it can be"); Russell Hardin, Constitutionalism, in The Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy 289, 289-301 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Handbook of Political Economy] (distinguishing contractarian and
coordination theories).
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sis manageable, the more prominent constitutional authority theories are
canvassed in Part III. Here, I want to emphasize the multiplicity of targets
for these theories.
A constitutional text is only one type of constitutional law, even
within the category of supreme law. A single document can be useful for
initiating a new regime but constitutionalism may rely on other sources.
Great Britain has a constrained constitutional system without a document
labeled "supreme law."10 8 Analogously, some might believe that certain
traditions ought to qualify as supreme constitutional law in the United
States, regardless of their reflection in a document entitled "The
Constitution."' 0 9 Judicial precedent is another possibility. Perhaps
Supreme Court decisions declaring constitutional law are themselves supreme law. 1 10 Functionally they are often treated as such, in that many
nonjudicial actors appear to accept the Court's claim that it is the final
arbiter of the text's meaning,'
and the Court is often interested in its
own constitutional doctrine and precedent. Finally, social movements
might generate constitutional law without Article V. 1 1 2 Depending on
the operative theory of authority, more than one source might qualify as
supreme constitutional law, or the Constitution might not qualify while
another source does, or perhaps nothing should qualify as categorically
supreme.
For now, however, the goal is to understand the relationship between
theories of the Constitution's authority and the methods for interpreting
that one text. These theories might be descriptive or normative, contentdependent or content-independent. But to make the authority/interpre108. Cf. Adam Tomkins, Public Law 7-14 (2003) (minimizing difference between
codified and uncodified constitutions, and stressing that much of England's constitution
actually is written down).
109. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.,concurring) (invoking "the gloss which life has written upon" the text);
Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
57-68 (1998) (using history for evidence of deep national commitments).
110. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 97, at 1824 (relying on courts' embrace of precedent
and public's acceptance of such decisions); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706-10 (1975) (accepting judicial exposition of certain
national ideals that are "not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written
Constitution").
111. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). There are, of
course, other views. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
6-32 (1999) (rejectingjudicial supremacy);Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1359-69, 1376-95 (2006) (arguing that democratic
societies should determine members' rights through legislative processes, given certain
conditions).
112. See 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 48, at 20-25 (describing five-phase
process through which political developments bring about constitutional change outside
Article V framework); cf. Reva B. Siegal, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 299-303 (2001) (exploring
relationship of social movements outside courts to textual meaning and judicial
interpretation).
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tation assessment manageable, it is best to begin with the Constitution
alone.
B. Methods of Interpretation
Interpretive methods must be distinct from authority thecries for the
latter to drive the former. And yet on one account, they are not: The
function of both is to identify law. Authority theories tell us what counts
as law, while interpretation yields law's meaning. It could also be true
that authority theories are impossible to apply without an interpretive
method. For instance, if the operative authority theory is Hartian legal
positivism, can one ascertain the practice and acceptance of officials without a method for interpreting information regarding official behavior?
But to animate the asserted relationship, there is an intuitive distinction.
One might suppose interpretation is a method by which textual meaning
is specified, while authority theories identify which texts are targets for
legal interpretation. This distinction is unstable in places, but it might be
workable.
Even so, explaining which practices qualify as interpretation is challenging. A group of literary theorists and their compatriots in law maintain that interpretation is by definition an inquiry into authorial intent. If
a reader is not interested in this intent, he is not "interpreting"; perhaps
he cannot even confirm disagreements over textual meaning.1 13 Others
persistently disagree. They contend that an honest interpretive effort can
reflect other considerations-such as concern for fair warning by attention to ordinary word meaning, or adherence to precedent about meaning, or sensitivity to just outcomes under new circumstances. 1 4 They
claim that readers can, do, and at least sometimes should resolve meaning in this fashion.
If this were solely a fight over a definition, the controversy would be
trivial-and puzzling in its intensity. But more might be at stake, depending on what function interpretation will serve. Indeed the dispute over
proper interpretive method seems unresolvable without a given objective
and institutional setting, which will reveal the interpreter's unique capacities and dynamic relationships with others. 1 5 Excellent "interpretation"
113. See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the
Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in Legal Hermeneutics, supra note 69, at 187,
192-97 (identifying interpretation with intent but stating that their definition does not
yield any insight into how intent should be ascertained).
114. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 104, at 348-50 (departing from
subjective drafter intent); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 58-64
(1994) (emphasizing interpreter's perspective); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(rejecting use of subjective and unexpressed legislative intent as "incompatible with
democratic government").
115. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 952, 954 (2003); Lawrence Gene
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will not look the same for a vacationer reading a poem for pleasure, a
sergeant reading a superior officer's orders, and an Article IIIjudge reading the Constitution during adjudication. When literary theorists and
lawyers dispute the acceptable reach of interpretation, they might have
different assumptions about the ramifications of their debate.11 6 In any
case, a core concern will be what officials and others do with legal texts
within concrete decision processes.
This last point has two implications for testing the authority/interpretation relationship. First, we ought to remember that institutional
and empirical factors could overrun any logical influence of an authority
theory on interpretive method. The institutional location might be far
more important to interpretation and sound decisionmaking than any
convincing authority theory. For instance, perhaps subjective drafter intent or the moral truth of the matter is not feasible for a Supreme Court
Justice to ascertain competently, even if the best theory of textual authority points in one of those directions. But these institutional factors may
be disputed and would leave the asserted authority/interpretation relationship uncontested on its own terms. Instead the assertion can be challenged directly, holding aside institutional and related empirical factors
to the extent possible.
Second, this generosity in bracketing institutional objections should
not be canceled out by a narrow definition of interpretive method. Limiting interpretation to a hunt for authorial intent constricts the set of practices that authority theories might influence. A broader understanding of
interpretation increases the range of potential implications, without taking a position on the best definition. A conveniently broad definition of
interpretation is a process by which meaning is derived from a text in order to
help resolve a dispute, especially when there is disagreement over the meaning of
7
that text."1
This notion can be filled out by reference to familiar choices commonly associated with legal interpretation. As an initial matter, the interSager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1212, 1263-64 (1978) (arguing that institutional constraints preventJustices from
enforcing every aspect of Constitution as they might understand it); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2003)
(positing that debates about legal interpretation must take into account institutional
capacities and dynamic effects); supra note 18 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Law and Interpretation, in Companion
to Philosophy of Law, supra note 98, at 126, 126 (relating interpretation to legal
application and decisionmaking); Paul Brest, Constitutional Interpretation, in 2
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 626, 626 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (similar).
117. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence, supra note 98, at 268, 268-70 (using "interpretation" to
include original meaning, underlying rationales, and application to particular cases);
Martin Stone, Focusing the Law: What Legal Interpretation Is Not, in Law and
Interpretation 31, 35-36 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (identifying "everyday notion" that
interpretation is called for only in cases of ambiguity).
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preter must have a sense of the appropriate linguistic rules. The
Constitution is thought to be written in English at various points in that
language's development, rather than in code resembling English, and so
presumably readers do well to follow corresponding rules of syntax. A
second interpretive strategy adds sources for understanding the text and
specifies the relationship among them. l l " Examples include ratification
era history, tradition thereafter, purposes associated with the text, plusto the extent used to construe existing text-moral theory with attention
to consequences.1 19 Some or all might be admissible. Third, interpretive
methods also might incorporate canons or presumptions of various
strengths. For constitutions, an interpreter might presume that no violation occurs unless the transgression is "clear." 120 Thematic readings fit
here as well.1 2 1 If the document is otherwise best read to achieve some
value (its relatively clear provisions so suggest), then the interpreter
might create a presumption that ambiguities should be resolved so as to
further this value. Finally, stare decisis often is considered part of interpretive method. Interpreters might take a prior interpretation as conclu1 22
sive, informative, or something inbetween.
There is a complication with including stare decisis within the practice of interpretation, however. It is the brittle distinction between
sources of information used to interpret text, as opposed to new sources
of law that are authoritative independent of that text.1 23 This distinction
is required by the asserted relationship between authority and interpretation. For a theory of authority to influence interpretive method for the
Constitution, we must be able to determine when the Constitution as a
text is being "interpreted" and when distinct sources of constitutional law
are being created. A strong version of stare decisis, one that makes past
decisions conclusive and unalterable without textual amendment, strains
the distinction. To make sense of the asserted authority/interpretation
relationship, attention must be confined to the use of precedent and
other sources of information for the purpose of interpreting the
Constitution as a text.

118. See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation

11-22 (1991)

(identifying six modalities of constitutional argument).
119. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale
L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law] (suggesting
possible value of cautiously analyzed foreign experience).
120. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 144.
121. See supra notes 32-33 (collecting sources).
122. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J.
1361, 1362-63 (1988) (describing different levels of deference Supreme Court gives to
common law, constitutional, and statutory precedents).

123. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (asserting
that some respect for precedent is necessitated by "the very concept of the rule of law").
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C. An Asserted Relationship
The relationship to be tested is unidirectional: Authority theories
are supposed to influence interpretive method. A weak version of this
assertion would be that certain authority theories are sometimes relevant
to interpretive method. 124 But often the assertion is stronger, maintaining that a theory of authority is necessary for constructing an appropriate
interpretive method. 1 2 5 Perhaps some scholars believe that authority theories can be sufficient for this purpose, but the necessity claim is
prominent.
In one respect, the necessity claim is obviously false. A reader can
interpret a text while ignorant of the text's status as law or even confident
that the text is not law. The Articles of Confederation are not law today
and yet anyone can read a copy and deploy interpretive techniques to
gain information from that text. Similarly, a reader is free to retain
doubts about the legal validity of our purported Twenty-Seventh
Amendment while comfortably interpreting its words. And it is possible
to ignore the undoubted legal status of a document, such as the Constitution, while thinking through its ambiguities. Better pleasure reading exists, but this does not foreclose a review of the Constitution for the sole
purpose of leisure and without regard to how the text ought to be used in
any other setting.
Thus the asserted relationship will make sense only within certain
interpretive situations. These situations are connected to the production
of law. More specifically, the asserted relationship can be taken as advice
to a legal decisionmaker, such as a judge or legislator or executive official,
regarding the normatively appropriate interpretive method for valid law. These
officials use interpretation to generate (or clarify) valid law, which they
are obligated to follow and which presumably influences others in the
community.
Once this situation is specified, a relationship between authority and
interpretation gains plausibility. In fact, some sort of relationship becomes undeniable. By identifying what counts as law, authority theories
create subject matter for interpretation by legal decisionmakers. One
might say that authority theories isolate law's raw material, while interpretive method processes these sources into more useful data for decisionmaking. Given the right setting, then, authority theories have at least this
targeting relationship to interpretation. And to this extent, the asserted
relationship cannot be fully separated from an institutional context.
The live question is whether an authority theory has any more specific influence on interpretive method for legal decisionmakers. This
124. For cautious language, see Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 11, at
157 (warning against analogies to nonconstitutional law); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive
Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 82-84 (2000) (indicating authority theory is only one
influence on interpretation and stressing empirical questions).
125. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 14.
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kind of claim has been vetted in the field of statutory interpretation to
help resolve disagreement over which sources of information beyond the
text should be consulted. 126 Faced with the question whether to consult
legislative history, the interpreter might decide to do so based on a particular account of the statute's authority. If the statute is authoritative because the legislature is likely to arrive at normatively correct decisions,
then it might be appropriate to recover more information about legislatorjudgments. There are other possible conclusions and important considerations, but the simple idea is that authority might logically guide stat27
utory interpretation. 1
The asserted relationship seems most tight for orders within hierarchies. Suppose your employer asks you to perform a task and her order is
not clear to you. You know that she communicated in English but you
cannot execute the order without more information. Perhaps your reason for caring about the order will help you interpret it: You might consider your employer the principal for whom you are an agent acting in
her interest, and arguably you should interpret her command in a way
that comports with her needs or desires, as best as you can discern them.
Granted, other considerations may inform your decision. Principal/
agent relationships have slack, and you might inject your own best judgment; indeed you might believe that your superior's rank and trustworthiness recommend leaving her at her word and acting in light of only the
unsupplemented order. Or, realizing your limited ability to accurately
infer unspoken wishes and the optimal course for the organization, you
might avoid guessing and do the least work consistent with the text of her
command. Or you might simply return to her for clarification. Even so,
the connection between authority and interpretation is probably intuitive
here, and its character might offer some boundaries on interpretive
decisions.
Can the same be said for interpretation of the Constitution? Some
believe the answer is yes. Prominent advocates of the unidirectional authority/interpretation relationship have been originalists or textualists,
including Michael McConnell and Frank Easterbrook. "For the textualist," Easterbrook says, "a theory of political legitimacy comes first, followed by a theory of interpretation that is appropriate to the theory of
obligation." 28 But the list is longer. Jed Rubenfeld endorses the central
126. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 Yale L.J. 945, 1009-10,

1027-28 (1990) (arguing for "non-communicative" model of legislation under which
legislatures are conceptualized as theoretical authorities, and recommending that courts
therefore "interpret statutes in light of the purposes that they may best be made to serve").
127. See Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in Law and Interpretation, supra
note 117, at 405, 432 [hereinafter Hurd, Interpreting Authorities] ("[T]he authority we
assign to law determines, in large part, the method by which we must interpret legal
texts.").
128. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1119, 1119 (1998); see also Bork, supra note 12, at 143-44 (equating law and original
intent); Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. Miami
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importance of an authority theory for constitutional interpretation and
uses it to conclude that his paradigm cases should be the guide.
"[L]egitimation precedes interpretation," he writes. 129 As well, certain
proponents of a moral reading of the Constitution allege that this interpretive directive is connected to their reasons for treating the text as
law. 130 Joseph Raz denies that aged constitutions are legitimate because
of the authority of their makers, but he accepts that proper interpretation
partly turns on an account of constitutional authority. 13 1 Similarly, David
Strauss maintains that unsurprising conventional readings are normally
required by Burkean conservatism and a coordination theory of authority
for the written Constitution. 13 2 Critical theorists also might relate authority to interpretation. Mike Seidman contends that, once we answer
whether the Constitution ought to and can be obeyed, questions about
33
what the Constitution commands "more or less answer themselves."'

L. Rev. 223, 226 (1986) ("[A] method of constitutional interpretation must reflect why the
Constitution is considered authoritative .... ");McConnell, supra note 2, at 1128; cf.
Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730, 744 (2000) ("[A]n account of
constitutional obligation . . . is a necessary component of theories of interpretation
because it specifies which interpretations are to count as erroneous and which as
correct.").
129. Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations, supra note 11, at 194, 198 [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Legitimacy
and Interpretation].
130. See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1482, 1486-89 (1985) (arguing that
"the source or basis of the Constitution's authority is a shared attitude about ... political
morality" that also influences interpretation); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice
and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43
Duke L.J. 1, 2, 54 (1993) (tracing constitutional authority to substantive goodness,
asserting that adherence to constitutional norms is strategic way to build popular support
forjust policy, and recommending figurative readings of text); Michael S. Moore, Justifying
the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2087, 2098,
2100-01, 2115 (2001) ("The connection [between constitutional authority and
interpretation] is almost as straightforward as the injunction that if you want to hit
something, it is best to aim right at it.").
131. See Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 11, at 157, 173-78 (arguing
that continuity is good moral reason for perpetuating multigenerational constitution and
that judges should carry over that insight when making judgments about how much
innovation should be allowed during adjudication).
132. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 12, at 911-13 (asserting that
conventionalist account of text "gives relatively specific guidance about how to interpret the
text"); see also Strauss, Jefferson's Principle, supra note 12, at 1732, 1744 ("[T]he
objective, in interpreting the text, is to make sure that the text can continue to serve as
common ground.").
133. Seidman, supra note 107, at 18 (referring as well to questions of how
Constitution should be enforced); see also id. at 12, 59-60 (defining key questions).
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FIGuRE 1.

ASSERTED RELATIONSHIP

1
Authority
Theory

2
Interpretive
Method

3
Meaning

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the asserted relationship in
three steps. In Step 1, an authority theory filters potential sources of law,
including supreme law. Candidate sources are endless: God's will, natural law, ratified constitutional text, tradition, precedent, revered federal
statutes, international law, popular sentiment, everything called ordinary
law. After these sources are weeded and prioritized by an appropriate
theory, a measure of vagueness will persist. In Step 2, an interpretive
method is chosen to yield additional meaning at Step 3, which might include legal doctrine to guide future decisions. Authority theories are supposed to influence proper interpretive method, and some theories are
linked to particular methods with dotted lines: contractarian theories
with originalism, good content theories with moral readings, and stability
theories with conventionalism or common law method. Brute fact theories, which are descriptive positivist accounts of valid law, have not been
prominently associated with a particular method of constitutional interpretation; nor do thematic readings have an apparent companion authority theory, though good content theories might match. But the graphic's
basic message is an analytic sequence running from authority to interpretation to meaning.
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THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

We are now in a position to grapple with influential theories of constitutional authority and their connection to interpretive method. The
former are grouped into (1) brute fact theories, which are descriptive;
(2) good content theories, which are normative; (3) contractarian theories; (4) stability theories, which are normative but (largely) content-inde134
I will
pendent; and (5) a brief treatment of postmodern unsettlement.
argue that brute fact theories have essentially no relationship to interpretive method; that good content theories are influenced by interpretive
method as much as the reverse; that contractarian theories would influence interpretation if only they were persuasive accounts of our
Constitution as law; and that the other theories have weak logical connections to interpretation on the order of mild side constraints.1 35 But three
preliminary questions about authority theories should be addressed first.
A. Authority Questions
1. Authority as to Whom? - Addressees of authority theories matter.
To consider intelligently whether a person ought to obey or enforce law
is to have a particular person in mind. In addition to its jurisdictional
boundaries, much law is designed for a subset of the political community.
Consider all the provisions in the Constitution authorizing government
institutions and offices and indicating the ambit of their lawful authority.
Their immediate addressees are officials. Obviously it would be silly to
deny the significance of the text for the entire political community, yet
36
the relevance of authority theories does differ across classes of persons.'
For instance, officials and naturalized citizens take an oath to support the
Constitution while most others do not. As with sound interpretive
method, the question whether a law is authoritative partly depends on
who needs to know the answer. 137 For convenience, the discussion below
134. Compare Frank Michelman's division of existential, rational, and decisional
bases for treating a constitution as binding, which match my first three categories. See
Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical
Foundations, supra note 11, at 64, 65-66 [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional
Authorship]. I separate stability from good content theories because their connections to
interpretive method are different.
135. A popular justification for respecting the Constitution combines a finding that
the text's content is passably good with a conclusion that departure would entail serious
instability costs. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 97, at 1792, 1803-06, 1813; Raz, Authority and
Interpretation, supra note 11, at 173; Strauss, Common Law, supra note 12, at 898. This
combination is powerful and is referred to below.
136. Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719, 727 (2006) (investigating rules
of recognition and concluding that "[piropositions about U.S. constitutional law . . . are
true or false relative to the practices of a stipulated group"); Frank I. Michelman, Ida's
Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 345,
362-65 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida's Way] (applying Rawlsian overlapping
consensus).
137. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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often assumes that the pertinent question is the Constitution's authority
with respect to officials. This assumption simplifies the analysis, follows
the text's most common addressees, and leaves room for a variety of theories. There will be places in the analysis where the general population is
relevant, however, and these will be noted.
2. Authority of What Strength? - An affiliated question is the strength
of law's authority. It can vary. An authority theory for a law might be
relevant to a class of people yet differently persuasive among them; and a
theory's persuasiveness might change over time. Beyond prudential reasons for respecting law, there is a set of conventional approaches in legal
theory for measuring the strength of an obligation to law. Law might be
only one moral consideration, a suggestive bit of information about good
behavior; or it might warrant a prima facie duty overcome by convincing
reasons of the same order; or it might provide an exclusionary reason for
behavior that knocks out competing moral considerations, at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. 138 Nothing restricts the question of authority to a binary yes-or-no choice. For the most part, however,
the strength dimension will be irrelevant to the analysis in this Part. It
tests the relationship between various authority theories and interpretive
methods for the Constitution as a text. Authority theories that are unpersuasive drop out, while viable authority theories might be connected or
disconnected from interpretive method regardless of their strength. The
relevance of the strength dimension to multiple sources of law is postponed until Part 1V.
3. Authority in What Unit? - It is sometimes intimated that the
Constitution should be judged as an undifferentiated unit, and that we
must or ought to respect all of the text or none of it.' 39 This could be
called "the Sinatra problem" for the Constitution's authority. 140 It could
be the result of several dynamics. First, incomplete authority might be
infeasible. Any remaining respect for the document could unravel once a
piece of it is overtly shorn from the domain of enforceable law. Second,
it might be too costly to devise and implement a test for which parts of
the Constitution should continue in force. Furthermore, partial authority is in tension with public pronouncements and popular understanding,
to the extent it exists. No official declares that the Constitution is our
138. See, e.g., Green, Authority of the State, supra note 100, at 36-39 & n.31
(distinguishing advice from exclusionary reasons); Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note
102, at 46-47, 53, 57-59 (explaining variable strength of even preemptive reasons that
attach to practical authority).
139. See Whittington, supra note 24, at 84 ("Ultimately, a system of governance must
be accepted or rejected as a whole."); Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for
Federalism, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 874, 878 (2006) ("If modern politicians and judges can
pick and choose which aspects of the Constitution to respect... , then entrenchment is a
fiction .... ").

140. Cf. Frank Sinatra, All or Nothing at All, on Reprise: The Very Good Years
(Reprise Records 1991).
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nation's fundamental legal charter-except for Article IV. Maybe these
assurances count for something.
The necessity of a unitary judgment is, however, open to question.
Whatever the popular impression, the true significance of many textual
provisions has shifted over time. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
had almost no real-world influence until recently,14 1 while the Contracts
Clause received some early attention but today is almost a dead letter. 142
Much of this is the product of changing fashions in judicial intervention,
and we should not forget that constitutional norms are followed for other
reasons. But the changes have been significant. Indeed, episodes of innovation in the modern administrative state might amount to departures
from the Article V process for updating the text. 143 Moreover, constructing a method for partial textual fidelity is not beyond human ability. The
doctrine of stare decisis could be adapted and applied to constitutional
text; perhaps that is roughly current practice.1 4 4 And evaluating the au145
thority of the entire Constitution presents its own set of challenges.
The more crucial point is that the relationship between authority
theories and constitutional interpretation can be tested regardless of
whether the document is viewed as an undifferentiated whole. There is
no apparent reason for the influence on interpretation to vary with the
severity of a Sinatra problem. As for contractarian theories, they are designed to justify the entire Constitution based on ratification processes.
These theories ought to be assessed on that basis. For the other theory
categories, we only need to know whether they are plausible justifications
for at least some of the Constitution and then investigate the possible
influence on interpretive method. The logical connection to interpretation, if any, ought to show up regardless of the amount of text that can be
justified by the theory.
The caveat is that an authority theory might be more persuasive if
the Constitution must be judged as a whole. Consider good content theories, which may be criticized for independently judging law's substance
without respect for law's authority as law. A Sinatra problem might soften
the criticism. Good content theories would be judging the entire
Constitution without the luxury of selecting preferable clauses and freely
discarding others. Or consider stability theories. The risks of departure
from the Constitution and recoordination are higher if respect for the
text is an all-or-nothing choice. Presumably, continued coordination
around the entire text would become more attractive as a theory for why
141. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503-07 (1999) (guaranteeing equal welfare
benefits to newly arrived state citizens).
142. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-34, 442-45 (1934)
(permitting temporary mortgage foreclosure moratorium).
143. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying note 63.
145. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra note 136, at 347-51 (raising questions about
unitary judgment).
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the Constitution counts as law, compared to a situation in which the
stakes are lower and it is easy to pick and choose which provisions suit us
today.
This does bear on my claim that the persuasiveness of an authority
theory seems negatively correlated with its implications for interpretation.
That claim depends on a satisfactory measurement of each authority theory's persuasiveness, which in turn might be affected by the presence or
absence of a Sinatra problem. Still, the complication seems mild. The
negative correlation claim is untouched unless a Sinatra problem changes
the relative persuasiveness of the various authority theories. It could be
that a Sinatra problem has roughly uniform effects across theories, although there is room for argument. Either way, the rest of the analysis is
unaltered by any Sinatra problem. For ease of exposition, the discussion
will proceed as if the Constitution must be judged as a whole.
B. Candidate Theories
A prior generation's t_1 decision cannot bind the current generation
at to simply because the first generation said so. 14 6 The t.L declaration is
not a justification for preferring one generation's judgment to another,
and likewise the Constitution is not authoritative for us because it announces its status as supreme law. 147 The following authority theories try
to do better.
1. Brute Fact and Hart's Positivism. - The least ambitious authority
theories attempt to define law according to conventional practices and
without normatively evaluating those practices. The best example is
Hart's positivism, which is aggressively descriptive. He meant his theory
to be "morally neutral" in that "it does not seek to justify or commend on
moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in [his]
148
general account of law."
If official acceptance and practice is the test for law, then the
Constitution seems to satisfy it. The document plainly qualifies as valid
and enforceable law in the minds and actions ofjudges and other government officials, to at least some extent. They repeatedly refer to it and
claim to act in accord with its meaning. The same conclusion can be
drawn from the more general legal or popular culture. These forces help
explain why oaths are still administered to incoming government officials, who swear or affirm their dedication to support "the Constitution"
146. An initial time period is often denoted "tl." But considering the importance of
distinguishing past from present and future, "to" will represent the present moment, "t.,"
an earlier time, and "t.," a future time.
147. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment,
supra note 50, at 145, 152-53.
148. Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 91, at 240.
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as a condition of employment.1 49 In this and other public ways, officials
advertise their willingness to adhere to the federal constitutional text and
warn others about departures. The Charters of Freedom exhibit could be
part of the advertising. One might even regard these ongoing practices
as a kind of mass official consent at every to. This position is not fixed. It
does not imply a lasting official obligation to treat the text as law or to
administer oaths in the future. Assuming "the people" are divisible across
generations, at some t., individuals would have to be free to stop consenting.150 In any case, there is widespread convergence on the written
Constitution's status as law today, enough to satisfy a descriptive authority
15
theory. 1
The question is whether this brute fact has any serious implication
for interpretive method. The answer is no. The extraction of meaning
from a document can take place through any number of interpretive
methods without gaining guidance from the conceded sociological status
of the text as law. This is the pattern of various interpretive schools, anyway. They all claim to respect the text. Originalism is supposed to excavate textual meaning; moral readings are readings of the text to include
references to normative inquiries; thematic readings are allegedly drawn
from the text plus perhaps context, and used to iron out ambiguities in it;
common law constitutional interpretation can be a process for elaborating textual meaning with reference to past judgments in combination
with right reason; popular constitutionalists may refer to mass judgments
on the text's correct meaning; and Thayerians attempt to locate decisionmaking authority in a sensible way without repudiating the obligation to
abide by the document's meaning. True, critics do not always take proponents at their word. One can dispute whether "interpretation" is really
taking place under these methods and challenge particular readings as
departures from the text. But those challenges gain no strength by reminding the reader that the Constitution is law. The reader rarely denies
152
that fact.
149. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring oath by President); id. art. VI
(requiring oath for federal and state legislators, judges, and executive officers); 4 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000) (requiring oath for state officers); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (requiring oath for
federal officers); Green, Authority of the State, supra note 100, at 228 (acknowledging that
officials' oaths may obligate them to obey law); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2000)
(requiring oath for naturalization).
150. Cf. Barnett, supra note 24, at 16 ("[F]or consent to have any meaning, it must be
possible to say, 'I do not consent' . . .
151. See generally Schauer, supra note 147, at 147-61. A complication is determining
what counts as "the Constitution." There might be disagreement, for example, about
whether a certain bit of text was properly ratified under Article V. See, e.g., infra note 175
and accompanying text.
152. Cf. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 36 (1988) ("[R]ecourse to 'the
Constitution' as a source of guidance within our own polity simply begs the question of
what counts as 'the Constitution,' not to mention what interpretive guidelines must be
followed.").
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Nor are brute fact authority theories justifications for the status quo.
They cannot recommend boundaries on interpretive practice that will
sustain the Constitution's status as valid law. Descriptive authority theories in particular must be agnostic on this issue.1 5 3 Certain interpretations might be so thoroughly unacceptable to the public or people in
power as to be repudiated, or, if accepted as correct interpretations, occasions for amendment or rejection of the document. But brute fact theories cannot take a normative position on these possibilities.
This suggests another route by which the brute facts of culture affect
constitutional law. Practical political or cultural pressures might directly
constrain the behavior of constitutional interpreters. Surely many officials who use the text are sensitive to such forces. But this will not reconnect any authority theory to interpretive method. First, we are envisioning a direct path from culture to interpretation. It is not clear that an
intervening authority theory for the Constitution as a document does any
work in this scenario.
Furthermore, today's political and cultural constraints on interpretive method are at least arguably modest. Official oaths and affirmations
are no help. They refer to "the Constitution," whatever that means, and
apparently not "as interpreted by method x."1 54 Nor does any one interpretive method dominate the public or official mind, to the extent there
is any awareness of the options (there is not even great awareness of the
plain text' 55). Although it would be controversial for the Supreme Court
to openly commit to reading the text in accord with Lutheran doctrine,
feasibility constraints will not select among the prominent interpretive
methods described above. Yet moral readings, originalism, and the
others significantly differ in their sources, presumptions, and attention to
precedent. Perhaps the most that can be argued is that some degree of
diversity in interpretive method among public officials is presently sustainable, and might be a fairly stable equilibrium. 156 If so, however, the
equilibrium does not recommend particular interpretive methods. At
most it would suggest a system that maintained interpretive diversity in
15 7
the political class.
2. Good Content and Condorcet. - A second theory category is unapologetically normative and dependent on the goodness of law's content.
153. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussing Hart and Kelsen).
154. This conclusion unfortunately depends on the correct method for interpreting
the oath. For one variation on the debate, see Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong. 298 (1967) (statements of Sen. Sam Ervin and attorney Joseph Rauh) (disagreeing
over whether Article VI oath should be interpreted to mean support for Constitution as
interpreted by Supreme Court).
155. See supra note 78.
156. See infra Part III.B.5.
157. The analysis might be different close to the time of ratification. See infra text
accompanying note 265.
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The first version of the theory involves a direct evaluation of content,
while the second version applies the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
a. Authority from Goodness. - An early contributor to this school was
David Hume, who denied that the modern state was grounded in a social
contract. At one point Hume indicated that a modem government's authority could be traced to its societal benefits, in that a sense of obligation
follows from reflection on "the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected.' 5 8 Whether or
not law's goodness can be the exclusive test of its authority (and it is nonsensical to assert that everything good is law and that every law is good),
many believe such normative evaluations should be a component of the
inquiry. 159 Good content theories are certainly compelling at the extremes. Morally optimal law is an outcome to be thankful for, while a law
with catastrophic effects should not be and likely will not be respected for
long.
This is not to deny serious problems with content-dependent authority theories. First, there are as many differences over how law's content
ought to be tested as there are differences over normative theory in general. Even if a single normative goal is stipulated, disagreement is bound
to occur over the application of a given normative test to a particular law
or legal system. 160 Perhaps the strongest (or widest) possible positive
evaluation of the Constitution's content is an overlapping consensus of
various normative frameworks. 16 1 This is the thrust of Frank
Michelman's recent work on constitutional legitimacy from a Rawlsian
perspective. 16 2 Second, good content theories can be unambitious and
incomplete. Content-dependent theories need not give any weight to law
on account of its enactment; they might make irrelevant the source or
process for creating the legal norm. This may cede important territory to
a law's opponents, making its authority contingent on subjective evaluations of content.
Nor are unadorned good content theories reliable normative tests
for whether to respect the Constitution. Assuming a Sinatra problem,
one must evaluate whether the document is sufficiently flawed to warrant
its total discard. Imagine that the Constitution as a unit could be graded
on a unidimensional scale of zero to ten, with ten meaning perfect and
158. David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1748), reprinted in Social Contract:
Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau 145, 160 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962); see also id. at
151 (distinguishing ancient tribal associations "obliterated by a thousand changes of
government and princes").
159. See supra note 135.
160. See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 274-81 (highlighting
such reasonable disagreement).
161. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 104, at 133-50, 158-68 (discussing
notion of overlapping consensus on allegiance to constitutional arrangements).
162. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra note 136, at 364-65 (moving away from
political contractarian notions, however, that suggest relatively specified terms with agreedupon meaning).
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zero meaning atrocious. Suppose further that the only relevant observer
marks the text with a seven. The question whether to respect the text as
law has not been sensibly resolved. Answering wisely depends on setting a
163
Conminimum level of acceptability in light of feasible alternatives.
tent-dependent theories, to be useful, should test law against its absence
and what might be put in its place. Perhaps a grade seven constitution
should be repudiated because a grade nine constitution can be obtained
with low decision and transition costs; perhaps a grade three constitution
should be respected because transitioning to anything better is infeasible.
These issues involve the comparative virtues of fidelity and innovation,
which are the domain of stability theories.
Difficulties would recede if the Constitution were a perfect ten. It
would not really matter who was responsible for the document because
there would be no motive to make changes and no reason to regret the
absence of motive. Risks and costs of transition would be irrelevant.
Some Americans have promoted such contentment. A sense of constitutional perfection might be detected in the patriotism of Felix
Frankfurter 64 and more in the assertion of George Sutherland that the
Constitution is "a divinely inspired instrument."1' 65 Intense admiration
for the document has been expressed more recently by Akhil Amar,
whose impressive scholarship is occasionally romantic. His latest book is
entitled America's Constitution: A Biography, and its opening words are
166
"America's Constitution beckons ....
But perfection is not our situation. The written Constitution is imperfect for our time according to any plausible normative framework.
Deep and controversial objections were noted in Part I, such as arguments from democratic theory, but shallower criticism is probably more
devastating to the perfection notion. To note a dozen troubling details:

163. Cf. Fallon, supra note 97, at 1798 (discussing theories of minimal moral
legitimacy); supra note 135.
164. See Justice Felix Frankfurter, On Being an American, Address for "I Am an
American Day," (May 21, 1944), in 33 Surv. Graphic 309, 310 (1944) ("Love of country,
like romantic love, is too intimate an emotion to be expressed publicly except in poetry.").
Frankfurter was not simply worshipping American heritage, however. See id. ("The
dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present." (quoting Abraham
Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3327, 3343 (James D. Richardson ed., N.Y., Bureau
of Nat'l Literature 1897))).
165. Joel Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State 8 (1951)
(quoting letter from Justice Sutherland).
166. Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography, at xi (2005); see also id.
at 5 (comparing Preamble to wedding vows). Amar is capable of criticizing the
Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in
Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 15, 15 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that text's system for selecting president "makes no
sense today").
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" the text uses male pronouns to refer to the President, Vice
President, and members of Congress, and voting rights do not
16 7
clearly make women eligible for these offices;
" the text mentions an army, a navy, and militias, but not an air
68
force;'
" the President must be "a natural born Citizen," and one reading of
the text excludes everyone alive today from eligibility by requiring
69
citizenship "at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution";1
" Congress may and has set a congressional election day long before
members' terms expire, and they regularly legislate as lame
70

ducks;1

* the Vice President has a plausible textual argument that he may
17 1
preside at his own impeachment trial;
" it is not apparent that the President may fire any federal officer
subject to Senate confirmation, especially in light of the impeach172
ment alternative;
" Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 describes how treaties are made but
not how, or whether, the country may withdraw from them;
" the First Amendment mentions only the federal legislature and
not executive or judicial conduct, let alone state and local government action;
* the Eleventh Amendment's text shields states from Article IIIjurisdiction with respect to suits filed by out-of-state, but not in-state,
1
plaintiffs; 73

167. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl.2 (referring to Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl.3
(Senators); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (members of Congress); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (Vice President);
id. art. I, § 7, cl.2 (discussing presidential vetoes); id. art. II, § 1, cis. 1, 6-8 (discussing
President); id. art. II, §§ 2-3 (same); id. amend. XXV, §§ 1, 3-4 (addressing presidential
succession and disability); cf. id. amend. XIX (protecting "[t]he right . . . to vote" of
citizens from denial or abridgment on account of sex).
168. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16; id. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
169. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. It depends on how one deals with the commas. See Jordan
Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 237,
243-47 (1995).
170. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (giving Congress power to set time of elections); id.
amend. XX, § 1 (settingJanuary 3 as final day of congressional terms); 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)
(setting November election day).
171. See Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on
the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341, 1357 n.72 (1983) (noting that
Constitution provides for Chief Justice to preside over President's impeachment, but
contains no similar provision concerning Vice President).
172. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (providing that "all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office" upon impeachment and conviction for certain misconduct);
The Federalist No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 77 ("The consent of [the
Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint."). But see Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 176 (1926) (invalidating statute restricting President's power to
remove certain officers appointed with advice and consent of Senate).
173. Contrast the judicial doctrine of state sovereign immunity, which is detached
from the Eleventh Amendment's text. See Allison Marston Danner & Adam Marcus
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" Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment appears to make importation of alcohol into a state in violation of state law a violation of
17 4
the Constitution itself;
* under the Twenty-Third Amendment, residents of the District of
Columbia receive electoral votes but not voting representatives in
Congress;
* Article V places no explicit limits on the time within which states
must ratify proposed amendments, so we seem to have a TwentySeventh Amendment that was proposed by the First Congress in
1789 but not even arguably ratified by three-fourths "of the several
States" until 1992.175
Accepting any of these criticisms defeats the perfection claim, and
many of them trade on thin ideological commitments. The flaws, moreover, could easily worsen. If anything, the pace of change has quickened
in the last few centuries, and there is cause to expect that norms suggested by the text will experience more friction with reality.
This leads to the fundamental message about content-dependent
theories of authority: They will not drive interpretive method even if
only one normative framework is selected. In fact, the logical relationship is in the opposite direction.
Consider the shallow criticisms of the text just listed. Readers will
have wondered whether there are convincing understandings of the
Constitution that defeat the asserted defects. For example, the facial
maleness of the document's pronouns might be ignored; this was a linguistic practice in the United States for a period of time. 176 As well, the
Constitution could be read in light of a continuing practice of accepting
women members of Congress, a contemporary morality that demands
this result, a similar spirit in the Nineteenth Amendment, and insufficient
indication that the Founding generation considered the question,
whatever their hypothetical expectations.' 7 7 Regardless, a method of inSamaha, Judicial Oversight in Two Dimensions: Charting Area and Intensity in the
Decisions of Justice Stevens, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2051, 2064-66 (2006).
174. See Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying:
Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 Const.
Comment. 217, 218-19 (1995).
175. See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Comment. 101, 102-03 (1994) (raising issue of
time limits for valid ratification).
176. See Ann Bodine, Androcentrism in Prescriptive Grammar: Singular 'They', SexIndefinite 'He', and 'He or She', 4 Language Soc'y 129, 138-41 (1975) (noting
"persistence for almost two-centuries" of using "he" to mean "he or she"). The second
definition of "he" in a popular dictionary notes use "when the sex of the person is
unspecified." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 534 (10th ed. 1993); cf. I U.S.C.
§ 1 (2000) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as
well . . ").
177. The first women to serve in the House and Senate took their posts between 1917
and 1922, respectively, and the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in between. See
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terpretation produces information about the Constitution's meaning,
which enhances one's ability to make content-dependent judgments. To
that extent, interpretation is driving authority. 178 Indeed there might
not be any such thing as preinterpreted constitutional content.
It is true that the Constitution's content may be normatively evaluated without a full-blown interpretive method. One might stipulate that
the text is written in English and refrain from more divisive choices. This
leaves a spectrum of possible constitutional meanings to judge togetherprobably a large range, but not an infinite range. Thus the Constitution
would be judged with certainty that the President must be at least thirtyfive Earth-years old, with less confidence that a woman is eligible for the
office, perhaps even less confidence that we have a Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, and so on. But while our good content theory has become
less dependent on information from a stipulated interpretive method,
the price is a less attractive authority theory. Greater uncertainty about
how the Constitution will be interpreted means a less concrete normative
assessment of its content. Resisting informative assumptions about interpretation, moreover, only prevents the arrow of influence from running
strongly toward authority theory. It does not establish that a good content theory can drive interpretation.
Is there any sense in which content-dependent authority theories influence the proper method of interpretation? The strongest possibility
seems to involve moral readings of the Constitution. 179 Consider a moral
theorist-egalitarian, libertarian, utilitarian, cosmopolitan, or whateverwho adopts two commitments: (1) respect a norm as law only if its content adequately comports with the relevant moral theory and (2) interpret legal texts to adequately comport with that moral theory. Thus respect for the Constitution would be conditioned on its moral goodness,
and interpretation would be consciously employed to satisfy this same
normative criterion. Randy Barnett and Joseph Raz take positions close
to this combination. 180
Office of History and Preservation, U.S. House of Representatives, Women in Congress:
1917-2006, H.R. Doc. No. 108-223, at 37, 54-55 (2006) (noting that Senator Rebecca
Felton served for one day). The only judicial treatment I have seen is Bickett v. Knight, 85
S.E. 418, 432 (N.C. 1915) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) ("Under the Constitution of the United
States no one is debarred from holding any office from President down because of sex.").
178. See Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Authority 148-49 (2d ed. 2005)
(noting that some scholars deem "the moral legitimacy of constitutions very much
dependent on the practices of their interpretation"); Frank 1. Michelman, The Problem of
Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can "Discourses of Application" Help?, in
Habermas and Pragmatism 113, 117-18 (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002) (challenging
Rawlsian constitutional contractarianism with pragmatic claims that "norms are not cleanly
separable from their applications"); David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 1854, 1864-65 (2005).
179. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
180. See Barnett, supra note 24, at 49-52, 128-30, 268-69 (advocating reading
Constitution to ensure respect for individual fights necessary for legal system to be
normatively legitimate); Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 11, at 173
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Yet even here authority is not driving interpretation in a sequential
way. The stumbling block is the role of overarching normative
frameworks. If such a commitment is dictating both an authority theory
and an interpretive method, it is not productive to assert that the theory
is influencing interpretation-or, more boldly, that one must first identify an authority theory before turning to interpretive method. The sequencing portrayed by the asserted authority/interpretation relationship
is absent. Indeed, the logically prior issue is the clean moral one: the
normative standard for desirable conduct.
Where else would a commitment to preserve the Constitution's
moral acceptability come from? Not from an authority theory. An authority theory is an if/then proposition that tests for the existence or respect-worthiness of law.181 Alone it cannot indicate that interpreters
should rig their readings to preserve the Constitution's authority. Authority theories lack the equipment to impose that directive. Most likely,
the combination of a content-dependent authority theory with a moral
reading includes yet other considerations: the practical necessity of treating the text as enforceable law, the risks of instability, and the desire for
good outcomes.
But now we are essentially following a general directive to do good,
or a slightly more specific directive to produce good law. Authority theories are unnecessary for and incapable of such advice. They are designed
for a narrower function of defining and assessing law-even if, like much
other conduct, their construction is animated by a prior and overarching
normative commitment. If theories of authority take on more responsibility, they forfeit their distinctive character, lose any unique leverage on
interpretive method, and begin to descend from the analytical heights to
the bare questions of sound policy.
We cannot hope for textual perfection by any rational measure, and
deep normative evaluation of the Constitution takes into account how the
document is interpreted. A good content theory does not itself present a
method of textual interpretation, although a moral reading is not a surprising companion once an additional reason is given for valuing the
Constitution's retention. None of this supposes an analytical sequence by
which the question of authority is first answered and only then may attention turn to interpretive method.
b. Condorcet and the Constitution. - Some will resist freeform normative evaluation of the Constitution and yet desire a content-related test for
its authority. It has been suggested that past generations of constitutional
(observing that constitutions are validated by practice "[als long as they remain within the
boundariesset by moral principles"); see also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 104, at 52-53
(giving constructive account of creative interpretation); cf. Fuller, supra note 95, at 82, 91
(intimating thatjudges should interpret statutes in an institutionally appropriate fashion"appropriate to their position in the whole legal order"-but also to "insure the success" of
the legal system).
181. See supra Part H.A.
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decisionmakers were exceptionally adept as well as public spirited, particularly the Founding generation, and that we should trust their judgment. 82 If so, these tLdecisionmakers could qualify as practical authorities on good behavior, whose decisions about constitutional law should be
respected and not disrupted by creative interpretation in to.
On these conditions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) becomes
attractive. It is the mathematical companion to recent interest in the reliability of mass judgments. 183 Condorcet and his followers demonstrate
that the majority judgment of large groups may be vastly more accurate
than smaller groups. Assume that a yes-or-no proposition with a correct
answer is at issue and that the average voter has a 60% chance ofjudging
the proposition correctly. With a few additional assumptions, the
probability that the majority of these voters are correct increases as the
number of voters increases. Thus the majority of three such voters is
nearly 65% likely to be correct and for forty-one voters the likelihood is
over 90%.184
18 5
Application of CJT to the Constitution is fairly straightforward.
The question under a content-dependent authority theory is whether the
document's substance is good enough to respect. Part of the Founding
generation decided whether the Philadelphia draft was superior to the
Articles of Confederation, and subsequent decisionmakers judged
whether proposed amendments were superior to the document as it then
stood. At least some of the participants were attempting to judge what
would be best for their posterity as well as themselves. One application of
CJT is to respect these pastjudgments, which could have significant logical implications for interpretive method. If the Constitution is authoritative for us because we trust the judgment of past drafters and ratifiers, an
interpreter might parlay that trust into some sort of quest for how those
past generations understood the text they were making. Again, institu182. See, e.g., Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia, at x-xii (1966)
(lauding drafters' judgment).
183. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy 91-108 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge 25-38 (2006) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Infotopia]; James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds 11 (2004) ("With most
things, the average is mediocrity. With decision making, it's often excellence.").
184. See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 135 & n.43. Increases
also can be achieved by enhancing the accuracy of voters; and the Theorem can hold if the
mean accuracy of the voters is over 50% even if some fall below that level. See also
Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 277, 283-87 (2001) (applying dynamic to more than two
options, where mean voter is more likely to select correct option than any other option).
185. A recent related argument is that the original Constitution is entitled to respect
because it was ratified by supermajority voting rules. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 31, at 385 (advocating originalism on this basis). A critical response is EthanJ. Lieb,
Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between
Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 113, 116-22 (2007) (relying
in part on time lapses and circumstance changes).
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tional and empirical considerations might intervene to soften or foreclose originalism, but hold those objections aside.
Unfortunately, the premises for Condorcetian confidence are lacking. This is true even if CJT applies to normative and not only fact questions, we ignore voting rights limitations, and we refrain from interpreting the decisions of many or most eligible voters not to participate in the
election of delegates for state ratifying conventions.1 8 6 For the Theorem
to hold, (1) each voter must answer the same question and hence cannot
answer questions such as "Is the Constitution good?" according to individualized personal preferences; 8 7 (2) the mean accuracy of all voters must
be better than random-for instance, greater than 50% for binary
choices;1 88 and (3) voters must make judgments independent of the votes
of others, such that strategic voting and cascades do not become
189
problems.
The first hindrance is that past generations answered questions different from the one before us. The Founding generation chose the original version of the text over the status quo, which might have been perfectly correct and might have attempted to take the well-being of future
generations into account. But the current generation might applaud the
Founding generation's choice as of tLIwithout deciding to ignore the new
setting at to. We understand the text's imperfections better today than
the original drafters and ratifiers. Adding subsequent generations who
successfully amended the text via Article V does not solve the problem.
Each of those decisions that amendment constituted improvement could
be normatively correct without answering whether departure or fidelity at
to is best. At best, past generations asked whether the text was good
enough for their generation in addition to ours. That is not the practical
question we face.
186. On the historical record regarding voter eligibility and turnout for elections to
the Article VII ratifying conventions, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our
Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 475, 563-65 & nn.255-256 (1995).
187. See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 134 (distinguishing every
legislator asking what is best for everyone from each legislator asking what is best for his
district). For less stringency, see Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's General
Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 567, 570-72 (1988) (noting that
individual preferences may cancel out); Krishna K. Ladha, The CondorcetJury Theorem,
Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 617, 629 (1992) (explaining that
addition of less-than-random accuracy voters sometimes improves group performance if
their biases are negatively correlated with majority's).
188. For exceptions involving small groups, see Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen &
Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 Theory & Decision 261, 271
(1983) (indicating that mean-voter and majority-vote accuracy are not always both above or
both below 50%).
189. See Sunstein, Infotopia, supra note 183, at 88-92 (discussing informational and
reputational cascades in deliberation); Grofman, Owen & Feld, supra note 188, at 273-74
(calculating opinion-leader problems). Nonindependent votes just should not be tallied;
they do not destroy the value of independent votes. Nor does "independent" forbid
deliberation; the problem is simply following others.
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These concerns are linked to the second CJT condition, involving
mean voter accuracy. Even if adequate numbers of t. drafters and ratifiers were voting on our well-being and even if we can sensibly pose this
question without a concrete alternative to the current Constitution, it is
not clear that their accuracy on that question is better than a random
guess. Most of the text is over two hundred years old. The Founding
generation achieved a remarkable political compromise, but they were
not omniscient. For example, their leaders did not fully foresee the development and consequences of national political parties, an event that
took place within their own lifetimes. 190 And if they were systematically
biased or their normative values are no longer held (consider the mix of
views on slavery, women's rights, and state power), their mean accuracy
on our well-being is less than 50%. If so, CJT magnifies the inaccuracy of
their aggregated votes.' 9 1
A different use of CJT takes much more recent conduct for its
"votes." One could look to the current generation for indications of support for the Constitution. This gets closer to the relevant question today,
it takes advantage of contemporary knowledge, and perhaps we can trust
(some subset of) today's population to make ajudgment better than random. But this option is obstructed. It runs into the third condition for
Condorcetian confidence in the majority because contemporary expressions of support are not always independent in the way the Theorem demands. This is a ramification of cultural constraints on change. 19 2 The
more the to population worships and defers to the judgment of past generations, the less likely the independent-judgment condition is
satisfied.193
Most important, the presentist application of CJT has the weakest of
implications for interpretive method. Even if every condition of the
Theorem is satisfied, one can only be confident that the Constitution as
now written is appropriately respected as enforceable law in our time. If
this suggests interpreters of the Constitution should ask these contemporary "voters" exactly what they believe they were validating, we are basi190. See Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall,
and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 5-6 (2005). It might be that the t-,
decisionmakers' ignorance or forecasting errors put them behind the veil such that their
judgment was not biased in the way that ours now is. But this reduces their presumed
average accuracy, and the implication of the tradeoff is unclear. Should we prefer our
degree of bias or their degree of incompetence?
191. The Article V version of supermajority voting would appear to reduce false
positives (erroneous judgments that the text should be amended) and increase false
negatives (erroneous judgments that the text should not be amended). A CJT proponent
would want an argument for why this tilt makes sense.
192. See supra Part I.C.
193. See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of
Reason, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1482, 1498 (2007) (identifying this "Burkean paradox").
Vermeule suggests the written Constitution's ratifiers may compare favorably to the
judgment of contemporary judges, but he does not appear to vouch for the reliability of
either. See id. at 1503-06.
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cally asking ourselves what we think the document means. This is not a
guide for interpretation. It is a license to choose-and independently at
that.
3. Contractarianismand Incentives. - Yet another line of theory turns
away from law's content and looks to the potential moral significance of
past commitments. These social contract or precommitment theories instead might be animated by ex ante justifications, which are also addressed below.
a. Social Contractsand Precommitment Models. - In contrast to Hume's
arguments from good consequences, theorists such as John Locke sought
to justify the authority of law on consent of the governed, bounded by
natural right and justice. 194 Consent can be a potent content-independent theory. One might believe consent enhances the accuracy of authority determinations or rightly respects human autonomy. And social
contractarian theory has a history of application to the Constitution. Elements of it are present in Federalist 78 and Marbury v. Madison, which were
written relatively close in time to the original ratification. Arguing for the
supremacy of the document over ordinary statutes, John Marshall referred to the "original right" of "the people" to establish principles for
their future government, 19 5 and Alexander Hamilton invoked the will of
19 6
"the people, declared in the Constitution."
Of course not every member of the political community expressly, let
alone "voluntarily," has consented to support the document as enforceable law. A contractarian authority theory requires renovation if it is to
survive. But, if persuasive, it could have serious implications for interpretive method. It might well suggest reliance on the ratifying generation's
views about the text's meaning, or at least their preferred method for
ascertaining meaning. 19 7 A modern cousin of "contractarian theories is
the notion of precommitment or self-binding, and federal constitutional
law is regularly gilded with it.
Precommitment is almost invariably illustrated with the story of
Ulysses (Odysseus) and the Sirens.i 98 Ulysses clogged the ears of his crew
194. SeeJohn Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government (1690), reprinted in Social Contract, supra note 158, at 1, 56-58, 70-84.
195. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
196. The Federalist No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 77.
197. I do not take a position on the best rendering of interpretive method at the
various times when the text was ratified. On interpretation at the Founding, compare the
connection to common law reasoning in H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding

of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 889, 894-902 (1985), with the assertion of some
anticipated invariant meaning and settlement by practice in Caleb Nelson, Originalism and

Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 523-39 (2003).
198. See Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII, at 148, 151-52 (Louise Ropes Loomis ed.,
Samuel Butler trans., WalterJ. Black, Inc. 1944) (1900). An influential scholarly use isJon
Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (1979). More recent
uses of the imagery include Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75

Fordham L. Rev. 475, 476 (2006), and Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 53, at 123.
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with wax so they would not respond to songs of the deadly Sirens, but
ordered himself bound to the mast so he could enjoy them without physical power to stray from his predetermined course. Assuming his initial t,
preference ought to have been satisfied, Ulysses' preselected constraint
on his to freedom would achieve a superior outcome in t+1. Scholars have
since identified several justifications and devices for self-binding.' 99
Ulysses' rational self-eliminated options to combat his passionate urges,
akin to an addict avoiding social settings that cue dangerous behavior.
Another motivation is preventing effectuation of preference shifts due to
hyperbolic discounting, as when a penalty for early withdrawal helps the
depositor save for a big-ticket item at the end of the year. A third motivation is strategic. Promises and threats can be made more credible to
third parties with a reliable precommitment, as when contracts are enforceable in court.
Each of these ideas probably resembles a piece of federal constitutional law, but the precommitment model is unsalvageable here. Key
flaws have been identified by a leading investigator of precommitment,
Jon Elster. One snag he identifies is the character of particular constitutional provisions: Some are best viewed as a majority preference entrenched against minority opposition, perhaps with anticipation that the
minority would become a sustained majority in the future. 20 0 Elster indicates that the Philadelphia Convention's compromises over slavery
20 1
amounted to this kind of distributional choice and political haggle.
Such events fit poorly with the idea of a rational actor constraining her
choices against short-term passion or interest.
Jeremy Waldron presents a related objection. Constitutional provisions often incorporate contestable moral questions. 20 2 Everyone in the
country might justifiably agree that searches should not be "unreasonable" and bearing arms should be a "right," yet disagree over the specific
content of those commitments. Equally important, time changes norms,
circumstances, and available information. When the time comes to apply
199. See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and
Constraints 88-174 (2000) [hereinafter Elster, Ulysses Unbound] (analyzing reasons and
modes of precommitment in context of current and historical constitutions); Jon Elster,
Don't Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of
Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1754-57 (2003) [hereinafter Elster, Don't Burn
Your Bridge] (discussing interest, passion, and reason as different motives for action and
explaining how foreseeable shifts in motivation can justify precommitment).
200. See Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge, supra note 199, at 1757-61.
201. See id. at 1761.
202. See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 266-75. The problem of
commitment to contestable moral answers might be self-correcting. Intergenerational
commitments that chafe might undercut a future generation's willingness to define its
political community to include the past, or might encourage selective use of history in ways
that mock precommitment. In any case, it should be understood that Waldron is not
demanding unmitigated presentism. His preference for majoritarian democracy requires
selection of a community both geographic and temporal. See id. at 272-75 (warning
against intergenerational commitment, nevertheless).
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constitutional commitments, often there will be reasonable disagreement
over the proper outcome, even with unanimous agreement on a general
principle. Prioritizing a past majority's t_
1 judgment and then calling it
precommitment against irrational urges can unfairly insult the current
majority operating in to. They might be acting rationally with the most
generous of public spirit, and better information. Nor is it obvious that
constitutional drafting happens in situations where highbrow rationality
dominates the forces of passion and narrow self-interest. New constitutions usually mark serious regime change, often in revolutionary ages.
Peter drunk-and now dead-might be issuing commands to Peter
20 3
sober.
This leads to the most fundamental problem: identifying any plausible "self" whose plans are "binding" over time, especially across generations. As for bindingness, the social construction claim in dead hand
complaints challenges the ability of t_1 to truly govern to.If the persistence of an arrangement established in t_
1 depends only on discretion in
to, then the precommitment model is inapposite. The model involves
practical impact on choices. This is what made the concept intriguing.
Applauding the victory of past preferences over current desires deepened
our understanding and evaluation of human freedom. Uninterrupted
freedom to choose from unbounded sets can be injurious. Removing the
binding destroys the concept. Insofar as "there is nothing external to
society," Elster observes, constitutions are unlike situations in which "the
individual can . . . entrust his will to external institutions or forces,
outside his control, that literally make it impossible for him to change his
204
mind."
There actually are mechanisms for a nation to effectively constrain
future policy choices. We have already reviewed the possibility of path
dependence in politics. And one nation might make assurances to others
via its constitution. We can regard Article VI's declared commitment to
treaty obligations as an instrument of foreign relations, 20 5 or clauses restricting expropriation of property as tools for attracting foreign invest-

203. See Elster, Ulysses Unbound, supra note 199, at 159 (citing examples of
constitutions written in face of social and economic crisis, revolution, regime collapse,
defeat in war, colonial liberation, and other upheavals); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 706 (1995)
(questioning characterization of constitutions as "Peter sober" and electorate as "Peter
drunk").
204. See Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge, supra note 199, at 1759-60 (emphasis
omitted) (asserting that device of increasing costs is not available to collectives; noting that
strategies of deleting options and delaying choices operate differently with respect to
individuals and groups).
205. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (referring to treaties as supreme law); Max Farrand,
The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 46-47 (1913) (describing "pitiable
spectacle" in which U.S. states could flout treaties under Articles of Confederation).
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ment.20 6 Governments that offer such external assurances may later face
pressure from other nations or nongovernmental organizations when a
departure is contemplated.
But even if national decisions at t. can have binding force at to, the
problem of "self' seems intractable. The people responsible for the bulk
of the constitutional text are dead. If they found a way to bind themselves to these arrangements, the question today regards constraints on a
completely new population. 20 7 Whether we should be thankful and treat
it as "our" precommitment is another question; many people do better
when others choose for them, if for no other reason than the savings in
decision costs, and continuing to treat the Constitution as law might close
off troubling strategic behavior. 20 8 But these are separate defenses of
cross-generational arrangements that do not fit the precommitment analogy. 20 9 Another way of testing the analogy is to ask whether it makes a
difference to the text's authority that someone can or cannot trace his or
her family heritage to members of a generation during which a ratification took place. Does such a genealogical connection to ratification
make the constitutional text more "yours"? For precommitment purposes, it is hard to see why it should.
Of course the intergenerational objection can be defused by erasing
distinctions among generations. This is not far from Rubenfeld's position. He maintains that "self-government" must be seen as a multigenerational project to understand and perpetuate the system. Although part of
the argument rests on a critique of persons behaving like impetuous con210
sumers with no sense of the past and too few long-term commitments,
the theoretical assertion is that the Constitution's authority follows from
the present generation's obligation to collaborate with people from t 1.
"If the Constitution legitimately binds us today, it does so insofar as we

206. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Legal Stud. 83, 94-97 (2002)
(exploring rights enforcement and judicial independence as comforting signals to foreign
investors).
207. See Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge, supra note 199, at 1758 (viewing
constitutions as designed to bind successive generations).
208. See id. at 1761 (noting there may be "benefits [to] being bound even if they
cannot be traced back to an intentional act motivated by the prospect of those benefits"
(emphasis omitted)).
209. Cf. Barnett, supra note 24, at 11-31 (testing legitimacy by individualized
voluntary consent or adequate assurance of just outcomes). Consider also Samuel
Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some
Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1985, 1994-95 (2003),
which follows Stephen Holmes's idea that constraint can be empowering. Issacharoff is
asserting the goodness of being or feeling bound, not necessarily the fact of self-binding.
210. See Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional SelfGovernment 5, 116-24, 143-44 (2001) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time]
(rejecting modern constructs of rationality that look "only [to] present preferences and
judgment").
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are members of the same people that gave itself this law. '2 11 Rubenfeld
defines "a people" for this purpose abstractly as a set of persons who now
exist or existed in the past "under the rule of a particular political-legal
order."2 12 Without doubt, certain people feel better and behave in socially beneficial ways when they think of themselves as connected to a
group or national history, and as contributing to its improvement.
Whether or not this attitude is popular with academics, it is felt deeply by
many.
True as that may be, generational collapse is neither universally experienced nor indisputably good. Certainly it is not necessary for today's
population to mesh its identity with the achievements and mistakes of the
past, any more than it is necessary for adults to root for the same sports
team as their great-grandparents. This is fortunate. Too much respect
for ancient arrangements hinders our ability to separate good efforts
from bad, and Rubenfeld himself is open to considering the entire sweep
of constitutional development over time. 213 The living ought to be discriminating in their look back. They may achieve excellent results for to
and t+ by not following every trajectory mapped out in t 1. And so the
conceptual possibility of a multigenerational people is no argument for
2 14
adopting the thought.
Nor will a conceptual collapse of generations resurrect the precommitment model for constitutional law. Insofar as the argument recommends that we adopt an attitude of respect for tradition and past effort as
a way of achieving socially desirable outcomes, it is not a surrender to selfbinding but rather a presentistjustification for respecting the past. Such a
recommendation avoids the puzzles of how to treat newcomers to the
United States and whether a centuries-old "People" of contested membership, character, and duration can be fused with today's population, at
least without serious discretion in the present. 215 But it is not precommitment. It is an exhortation to feel bound in to so as to achieve a healthy
balance of freedom and constraint over the long run. 216 If this recommendation is attractive, moreover, it is difficult to find practical guidance
211. Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, supra note 129, at 215; see also
Kronman, supra note 67, at 1064-68 (asserting content-independent duty to nurture past
undertakings).
212. Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time, supra note 210, at 153-54. Rubenfeld
distinguishes his idea of a people from uniformity of thought and homogenizing
nationalism, see id. at 145-52, 154, and he accepts that there may be more than one
"people" within a single national territory, see id. at 155, 158 (discussing slavery).
213. See id. at 190 (discussing post-enactment paradigm cases).
214. See id. at 156-58 (fixating on conceptual possibilities and analogy to single
persons over time); cf. id. at 159 (suggesting that identifying with perpetrators of past
injustice can bring inequities into view).
215. See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 134, at 76-82 (suggesting
necessarily content-dependent normative component in defining multigenerational
"people").
216. Rubenfeld distances himself from precommitment. See Rubenfeld, Freedom
and Time, supra note 210, at 125-29 (looking for independent right reasons for action);
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for interpretation. The commitments of the past would be watered down
by the norms and circumstances of the present. Rubenfeld's vision of
constitutional adjudication indicates as much. It operates on contemporary judgments about paradigm cases, selected out from t-1 by people in
to.
This skeptical assessment of contractarian authority theories should
be open to revision. Part of the critique's force derives from an assumption, sometimes hidden, that jurisdictional exit is difficult. When exit is
impractical or a morally problematic imposition, there may be a compensating desire to enhance the voice of people within a political community. 217 Constraining them with dated constitutional bargains might
seem intolerable. But the costs and opportunities for international migration are not static. Transportation technology has been driving down
the price of relocation for many decades; communications technology is
making geographic proximity less crucial for thick human relationships;
and globalizing forces could partly homogenize cultures without eviscerating differences in legal systems. Of course cultural divides and locationspecific human capital often restrict nation-hopping to economic and
other necessity. Still, these frictions are not stable. Consent to national
law would be even easier to accept if members were well-informed about
218
alternatives; perhaps a subsidized international Rumspringa is in order.
Today's option set is quite different, however, and contractarian theories
of constitutional authority are vulnerable for the time being.
b. Forward-lookingIncentives. - A final thought involves incentives for
political mobilization. This is not a well-developed theory of authority for
our Constitution, but the argument would be that treating the existing
text as law respects the ratification victories of the past. And respecting
those victories in our time might create desirable incentives for presentday actors to achieve similar victories. 219 Article V victories become special in that they are bundled with longevity. Those who successfully navigate the arduous process of formal amendment retain that achievement
unless an equally powerful political force survives the same process. In
this way, proponents of textual fidelity can offer a fully presentistjustificaRubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, supra note 129, at 216-17 ("[W]e can know the
entailments of our commitments only by living them out.").
217. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States 114 (1970).
218. Rumspringa is a practice in which Amish youth may, without penalty, leave the
community and experience alternative lifestyles before deciding whether to return for the
long term. For a skeptical view of the value of exit options in illiberal communities, see
Steven V. Mazie, Consenting Adults? Amish Rumspringa and the Quandary of Exit in
Liberalism, 3 Persp. on Pol. 745, 753-55 (2005). For an inquiry into international mobility
among elite workers and the possible sorting effect on rights regimes, see David S. Law,
Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 66-81, on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=975914. I am indebted to Adam Cox for helpful discussions on this thought.
219. Cf. Whittington, supra note 24, at 111-13 (seeing originalism as potentially prodemocracy).
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tion for the text's authority, one that suggests an originalist interpretive
method as strongly as any other theory.
Such incentive-based reasoning is standard in law and economics,
and it has been employed to fend off other dead hand complaints. For
example, a degree of respect for the dead authors of wills and trusts can
be defended on the basis of forward-looking incentives, rather than an
emotional attachment to the deceased or the awkward belief that the
dead themselves have rights against the living. 2 20 Respecting testamentary documents signals their efficacy to the living and adds value to property. There may be objections, but the dynamic is understandable. And
constitutional text tends to have a safeguard that wills lack: The drafters
and ratifiers presumably live under the text before passing away.
Although an incentives approach might be stronger than other contractarian efforts, it suffers from serious weaknesses. The first is that one
must adore the actual Article V process to make the theory persuasive.
The incentives such fidelity creates are hitched to the quirks of Article V.
Its brand of supermajority lawmaking slants toward small population
states, both in Congress's role and in the role of state legislatures or conventions. Privileging states as states might be good or bad, but the slant is
at least debatable and in tension with modern nationalist trends. One
can sensibly prefer, say, a national plebiscite or two for formal amendment. True, the best answer for any one jurisdiction is partly clouded by
22
empirical uncertainty and contested value choices, as discussed above. '
But here, uncertainty is insufficient. The incentives argument requires
dedication to a program that affirmatively promotes Article V lawmaking.
The second weakness is equally problematic. There is no apparent
theory for the optimal duration of Article V victories, partly because there
is no consensus account of the value of such political mobilization. Even
if that value can be stipulated, how powerful should the incentives be?
Did Article V somehow obtain the right balance? What if supreme constitutional norms formally expired after fifty years? One hundred? The issue resembles an economist's struggle to determine an optimal patent
term. 2 22 Entrenchment creates tradeoffs. Only a particular (perhaps peculiar) theory of democracy confirms Article V as a process for legal
change that ought to be encouraged and that provides the appropriate
amount of encouragement.
4. Stability as Coordination and Tradition. - A final group of theories
is perhaps less optimistic about the uses of a constitution. These theories
220. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 518-20 (6th ed. 2003)
(recommending efficiency constraints, however, based at least in part on defects in testator
foresight); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 808-22 (2005)
(discussing right to destroy as necessary to stimulate creation when viewed from ex ante
perspective).
221. See supra Part I.B.
222. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1813, 1823-29 (1984) (identifying variables).
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demand consideration of stability's virtues and innovation's vices. But
unlike brute fact theories, stability theories offer a normative justification
for the persistence of multigenerational arrangements. Burke is commonly used as the avatar of regime stability, 22 3 but others, including
Hume 224 and even Jefferson, noted its value. "[M] oderate imperfections
had better be borne with," Jefferson once wrote, "because, when once
known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of
225
correcting their ill effects."
There is no need to rely on a mystical respect for the work of past
generations. In fact, the age of an arrangement is not necessarily relevant. Modern argument for constitutions as solutions to a pure coordination game 2 26 or a (badly named) battle of the sexes 2 27 does not turn on
the text's age. In the former, participants are indifferent to the outcome
within a set of options but they do prefer to coordinate on the same option. The perennial example is driving on the left or right side of the
road. In battle of the sexes games, participants have different preferences but none stronger than the desire to agree on the same option. In
either game, a salient focal point might resolve the matter without a claim
to optimality in any other sense. Thomas Schelling's memorable example was a decision about where and when to meet in New York City. Because the participants could not communicate and had one shot to select
a location and time of day, and because the set of possible choices was so
large, a meeting might seem hopeless. But an outright majority of
Schelling's New Haven respondents chose Grand Central Station and another large majority chose noon. 228 However arbitrary, salient choices
prevailed when the goal was a given.
A force that moves people into these congenial game theoretic models-which work poorly for issues like abortion policy-is uncertainty.
The inability to predict the consequences of different options pushes
decisionmaking toward reasonably ascertainable variables.
Often
enough, predictable decision costs and transition costs will outrun less223. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 81 (Frank M.
Turner ed., 2003) (1790) (expressing concern over judgment of "temporary possessors
and life-renters").
224. See Hume, supra note 158, at 157 (emphasizing stability over "violent
innovations").
225. Jefferson to Kercheval, supra note 41, at 11-12 (denying support for "frequent
and untried changes in laws and constitutions").
226. See David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study 35-36 (1969)
(explaining that individuals are capable of coordination even without communication);
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 54-58 (1960) (identifying hypotheticals that
illustrate tacit coordination among parties with common interests).
227. See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertmer & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law 41-42 (1994) (describing hypothetical version of game in which man and woman
have differing, and perhaps stereotypical, preferences for their leisure time).
228. See Schelling, supra note 226, at 55 n.1, 56.
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certain net benefits from one option over another.2 29 The option selected becomes less important than ending the decisionmaking process
expeditiously.
In addition, stability theories help complete good content theories of
authority. They point to the dangers of transition. Of course stability is
not always possible or better than change; we need a normative framework to help judge the tradeoffs. But decision costs, transition costs, and
the risks of failing to recoordinate on a better arrangement should be
recognized in to regardless of when or how the current arrangement got
started. Indeed there may be justice in maintaining coordination around
a basically good legal system. Refusals to comply with a generally just
system can be a form of free riding, may encourage others to stop coordinating within the system, and could result in the system unraveling. 230 As
well, stability theories have the potential advantage of relative contentindependence. They speak to audiences unconvinced of the value of the
law's content standing alone. And, unlike contractarian theories, David
Strauss has observed, stability theories age well. 2 31 They are everlasting
presentist arguments for respecting certain legal arrangements that survive into to.
Stability theories seem like fitting justifications for treating the
Constitution as enforceable law. Indeed, recent empirical work in political science and economics suggests that many constitutional design
choices do not significantly affect measurable aspects of human well-being. 232 It has been difficult, for instance, to demonstrate an advantage
2 33
for either democracy or dictatorship in producing economic growth.
Tinkering within the democratic category is probably less likely to change
per capita GDP. 23 4 In fact, a host of constitutional design choices are
229. See Samaha, Undue Process, supra note 19, at 614-25 (discussing ways in which

Constitution can be used to limit government decision costs).
230. See, e.g., Klosko, supra note 106, at 37-39 (discussing problem of free riders);
William S. Boardman, Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, 97 Ethics
546, 549-50 (1987) (arguing that law functions to solve coordination problems); John
Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in Law and Philosophy: A Symposium 3,
5-11 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (applying duty of fair play to law-following, as obligation to
fellow citizens in just system).
231. See Strauss, Jefferson's Principle, supra note 12, at 1720.
232. Studies are reviewed with cautionary notes in Samaha, Undue Process, supra
note 19, at 624-29.
233. See Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions
and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, at 142, 166-67, 178-79 (2000).
234. See, e.g., Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory 208-09 (1996)
(asserting that none of his three democratic types "result[ ] in excellent economic
outcomes such as a high rate of economic growth, low inflation and little unemployment");
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 Econ. & Pol. 207, 215, 219-20, 226 (1995)
(presenting multiple regression analysis indicating weak correlation between GDP and
levels of political freedom). But cf. John Gerring et al., Centripetal Democratic
Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 567, 575-79 (2005)
(asserting some positive effect on per capita GDP from more centralized democratic
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subject to serious uncertainty regarding their influence on any number of
outcomes. To take just one additional example, it is extremely difficult to
ascertain the policy or power-related consequences of invalidating oneHouse legislative vetoes 2 35-let alone whether any consequence was an
improvement over the status quo ante.
This is not to suggest that our Constitution is irrelevant or that conceivable changes would not produce better results. Amartya Sen has
claimed that no famine has occurred in a multiparty democracy with elections and a free media. 236 People might live longer or healthier lives in
democracies, 23 7 and perhaps respecting a written constitutional text with
basic democratic features is conducive to that outcome. Protecting property rights, contracts, and other market elements has been associated with
economic well-being, 238 and certain forms of judicial independence
might help. 239 Moreover, certain rights provisions or democratic forms
might have intrinsic value. But there is much constitutional territory in
which the effect of fidelity or departure is not safely predictable. Furthermore, if there is a Sinatra problem, 240 we cannot separate textual provisions worthy of respect from those that are not. The entire text would
have to be respected to at least a degree. Hence the text's greatest virtue
may be its ability to help initiate basic institutions and reduce decision
costs on choices that do not matter much.
arrangements). For an attempt to link self-reported life-satisfaction scores to direct
democracy in Swiss cantons, see Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics:
How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being 136-50 (2002).
235. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (invalidating one-House veto);
Samaha, Undue Process, supra note 19, at 638 (discussing Chadha and noting possible
congressional responses); cf. Jessica Korn, Improving the Policymaking Process by
Protecting Separation of Powers: Chadha & the Legislative Vetoes in Education Statutes, 26
Polity 677, 677-80, 687-96 (1994) (finding no post-Chadhainfluence on policy outcomes
or balance of power between branches in education policy, although claiming Congress
stabilized certain funding decisions, visibly took responsibility for them, and initiated
negotiated rulemaking via statute).
236. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 51-52, 178-88 (1999).
237. See Przeworski et al., supra note 233, at 228; Thomas D. Zweifel & Patricio Navia,
Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality, J. Democracy, Apr. 2000, at 99, 99 (finding
that infant mortality is significantly lower in democracies than in dictatorships). But cf.
Michael Ross, Is Democracy Good for the Poor?, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 860, 860, 863-68,
871-72 (2006) (using some imputed values and concluding that democracies spend more
money on public services but democracy has "little or no effect on infant and child
mortality").
238. See, e.g., Wenbo Wu & Otto A. Davis, The Two Freedoms, Economic Growth and
Development: An Empirical Study, 100 Pub. Choice 39, 56-57 (1999) ("[H]igh degrees of
economic freedom tend to lead to high rates of economic growth for countries with both
high and low levels of income.").
239. See Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 445,
448-55, 464-65 (2004) (excluding "transition economies" but otherwise linking the
authors' measures ofjudicial independence to property rights, and judicial independence
and constitutional judicial review to political rights).
240. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 664 2008

2008]

DEAD HAAD ARGUMEAS

The critical issue for present purposes is the relationship between
stability theories and interpretive method. It has been suggested that coordination and affiliated theories confine textual interpretation by recommending conventional readings. 24 1 By doing so, an interpreter acts
consistently with the benefits of coordination. Furthermore, a shocking
interpretation of any part of the text might have far-reaching impact. Observers could become uncertain about the meaning of the entire document as soon as surprising results become salient. This uncertainty might
even jeopardize the Constitution's enforceability. Some claim that popular support is the ultimate test for constitutional longevity and that a constitutional text can be self-enforcing: A sufficiently precise text can make
transgressions relatively easy to identify, and the document can become a
242
focal point for coordinating popular support of textual constraints.
This possibility begins to disappear as the variance in plausible interpretations increases.
This is all true, but the relationship to interpretation is actually attenuated. The first complication was discussed in relation to good content
theories. 24 3 Strictly speaking, an authority theory is supposed to test for
the presence of (respect-worthy) law without taking a more controversial
position on how much law there ought to be. If the Constitution is adequately serving a coordination function, then a stability theory will see a
respectable law. It takes an additional normative commitment to want
the document to continue that function, and thus to impose conventionalist restraints on interpretation. At this point, however, it seems that a
more general norm is influencing both authority and interpretation. A
global stability value need not operate through an authority theory that
filters sources of law, and only then apply to interpretive method. The
analytic sequence would be unnecessary. It is quite possible that a constitutional stability theorist will accept a degree of respect for the
Constitution as a side constraint, rather than a polestar, for
interpretation.
Even if this concern gives too little credit to authority theories, the
implications for interpretive method are still limited. Most important,
many stable methods of interpretation should deliver coordination-related
benefits. The described threat to coordination around the Constitution
is variance in predicted interpretive outcomes. But variance can be reduced in a number of ways. Uncertainty about the Constitution's meaning can be reduced by assurance that an originalist inquiry will take place,
or that a moral reading will be conducted, or that judicial precedent will
be taken as given, or that ambiguous provisions will be read in light of a
theme such as deliberative democracy. To be sure, sufficiently outra241. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 12, at 912-13.
242. See Barry R. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, in Democratic
Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, supra note 59, at 343,
348-53 [hereinafter Weingast, Designing].
243. See supra text accompanying notes 179-181.
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geous interpretive outcomes threaten the coordination function. Declaring that fidelity to the Constitution requires severe wealth redistribution
or secularization of civil society would jeopardize coordination around
the text in 2008. This practical truth exerts a degree of constraint on
interpretation for those who are already committed to promoting stability, and it suggests that stability theories are not wholly content-independent in operation. Nevertheless, the debate over appropriate interpretive
method today retains many choices within the range of reasonable disagreement. Coordination theories are not very useful in selecting among
these candidate methods.
To put it another way, stability is a value involving the pace of change
and not necessarily its direction. Interpretive method can slowly migrate
in many possible directions without undermining the Constitution's focal
status. Creeping originalism or creeping moralism would be equally acceptable. This conclusion is reinforced when legal advice is widely available, and the anticipated conduct of a single institution, namely the
Supreme Court, is also a focal point for coordination on textual meaning.
Expert advice and Court supremacy facilitate the quick settlement of constitutional disputes. These resolutions might be normatively suboptimal,
but that is not the concern of stability theories. They are designed for
just such occasions by providing reasons to accept imperfection. As long
as a stability theory is able to accommodate some change, the direction of
that change is not determined by the theory. Changes in interpretive
method would be slowed without being guided.
Furthermore, once an interpreter is committed to stability as a general norm, the Constitution becomes only one source to respect. It is at
most one point in a constellation of provisional social settlements. Interpreters of this particular text presumably would not want to dislodge arrangements that have built up alongside-and perhaps contrary to-the
best rendering of the text's meaning. Take Barry Weingast's scholarship
on self-enforcing constitutions. 2 44 His claim is that written constitutions
can provide a focal point for citizens to make judgments about government transgressions. Competing forces in society may enter into pacts for
mutual advantage, and these pacts might be self-enforcing if reflected in
a text.245 Setting aside normative objections to these equilibria,
Weingast's examples from U.S. history are revealing. He points to various
244. See Barry R. Weingast, The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty, 19 J.
Econ. Persp. 89, 90-99 (2005) [hereinafter Weingast, The Constitutional Dilemma]
(analyzing how constitutions might facilitate citizen coordination by averting prisoners'
dilemma and government divide-and-conquer strategy); Weingast, Designing, supra note
242, at 348-53 (arguing that written constitutions may lower stakes of politics if enforced);
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 245, 252, 255-56, 258 & n.34 (1997) (remarking on mass/elite interaction);
see also Adam Przeworski, Self-Enforcing Democracy, in Handbook of Political Economy,
supra note 107, at 312, 313 (suggesting that for democracy to sustain itself, income
redistribution must be neither "insufficient for the poor [n]or excessive for the wealthy").
245. See Weingast, The Constitutional Dilemma, supra note 244, at 90-99.
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compromises over slavery and conflicting sectional interests that stitched
together an operative federal government from the Founding until the
Civil War. 246 But these compromises were only partly reflected in constitutional text; they were also instantiated through statute and less formal
conventions. This is a reminder that the Constitution is a small part of
the status quo and that valuing stability may justify that document's continuing status as law without saying much specific about its interpretation.
Any societal equilibrium is likely to be multi-sourced.
The importance of sources beyond the Constitution leads to a closing remark. There is another facet to the common law method, one that
claims wisdom deeper than simple conservatism. The notion is that the
process of reviewing, respecting, yet sometimes revising precedent
through contemporary reason will accumulate knowledge across generations without locking in features of law that can no longer be defended. 2 4 7 Here the avatar is Hayek as much as Burke: The argument is
optimistic and progressive. Even if we cannot fully understand the rationale for a tradition embodied in an institution, "the evolutionary view is
based on the insight that the result of the experimentation of many generations may embody more experience than any one man possesses. 24 8
Those more willing to interrogate tradition or precedent with contemporary reason may still reward longevity with some respect. 2 4 9 This argument is content independent, but it does depend on a long-standing
arrangement.
However persuasive, 250 this assessment of common law reasoning is
at most tangentially related to the authority of the Constitution. The advocated method has no strong reason to prefer the written Constitution
246. See id. at 97-98 (discussing Missouri Compromise of 1820, Compromise of 1833,
and Compromise of 1850).
247. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 136-38 (1921)
(promoting common-law method).
248. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 62 (1960); see also Burke, supra
note 223, at 74 ("We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock
of reason . . . ."); Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism 3-4 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.
John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 336 (2d Series), Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 158, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=975538 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (comparing and contrasting
Hayek's evolutionary optimism with Burke's indication that traditions aggregate
information). Burke also suggested reduced decision costs, see Burke, supra note 223, at
74 (recommending "prejudice" for its "ready application in the emergency"), and
intergenerational identity and obligation, see id. at 81.
249. See Brown, Tradition and Insight, supra note 68, at 180 (rejecting as too extreme
attempts to ignore lessons that might be drawn from history); Strauss, Common Law, supra
note 12, at 891-97 (explaining that rational common law adjudication avoids blind
obedience to past yet proceeds with humility).
250. Cf. supra Part III.B.2 (skeptically reviewing application of Condorcet Jury
Theorem to Constitution). A concern with deference to tradition is the ex ante incentive
to attack novel practices as soon as possible, before much information about the
consequences of the practice can be obtained. Knowing that a practice may become
entrenched at t.,can encourage to challenges.
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to certain contemporary statutes, or even the views of expert executive
officials. The Constitution is at best one source of wisdom and any guidance on how to read that source is not obvious. As Strauss puts it, "our
written constitution has, by now, become part of an evolutionary common
law system." 25 1 Here the appropriate relationship among multiple
sources of law is rising to the surface, and a unidirectional relationship
between authority and interpretation of respective sources is fading.
5. Postmodern Unsettlement. - There is, finally, a postmodern perspective on authority and interpretation. Mike Seidman ingeniously explores
the possibility that respect for the Constitution might be justified by unsettlement rather than certainty. 252 The idea is that the text is open to
differing, even diametrically opposed, readings and has been used to validate very different goals over time. This openness preserves the possibility of unsettling any constitutional order, however resilient current arrangements might seem. Hope for the vanquished comes from the
possibility of the worm turning. "Political community is maintained precisely because there is no permanent settlement and, indeed, no exclusive, agreed-upon method for amending temporary settlements." 253 Unsettlement theory has attributes of stability arguments but is fueled by
indeterminacy.
Some of the unsettlement argument seems true as a descriptive matter. Often in American history, constitutional text remained stable while
its interpretation and the structure of our government did not. And the
Constitution obviously is a revered cultural icon appropriated by many
different ideological movements. Indeed the opportunity for altering supreme law through shifting interpretation makes constitutional argument
all the more attractive. But even assuming positive unifying effects from
the situation, no one should blinker the decision costs associated with
interpretive openness combined with supremacy. This combination encourages arguments over the content of supreme constitutional law,
which require resources to resolve, even when short-term distributive consequences are the only stakes. At least some of the arguments surrounding the written Constitution involve nothing more majestic.

251. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 12, at 885 (emphasis added); cf. Harry H.
Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of
Adjudication 81, 86 (1990) (linking court-identified principles to text but stating such
principles "have a life of their own").
252. See Seidman, supra note 107, at 210-16 (concluding that final resolution of
constitutional conflicts "would require us to crush our own wonder at the contradictory
ways we experience the world"); see also Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank
Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 485, 493-94 (2004)
(emphasizing interpretive openness and discourse values); supra note 161 (referencing
overlapping consensus).
253. Seidman, supra note 107, at 55. Seidman assumes a background of relative
political indifference, economic wealth, and cultural solidarity, and he critiques the notion
of entrenched constitutional law rather than all law. See id. at 54-58, 62.
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More important, the actual interpretive advice from an unsettlement
theory is challenging to operationalize. What should an individual interpreter do when faced with a constitutional argument? In the unsettlement model, rights claims are supposed to be indeterminate. 2 54 Should
there be an institutional mechanism for assuring a plurality of interpretive perspectives at any given point in time, or perhaps shifting methods
from time to time? Such a mechanism seems to qualify as a constitutional
settlement forbidden by the theory, as Seidman wonders. 25 5 Possibly unsettlement theories are less recommendations than observations about
the dynamics of constitutional law.256 Whatever insight is delivered, however, offers little advice on interpretive method.
IV.

THE INTERPRETATION CONNECTION REVISITED

The logical relationship between authority theories and interpretive
method is not as reliable as the assertion with which we began, at least not
for the Constitution. Combinations of multiple authority theories only
make the relationship to interpretation more complex. There is no good
reason to exhaust the possibilities here; we have not even enumerated
every conceivable theory or possible component of a robust interpretive
method. Instead this Part collects lessons from the analysis, offers an explanation for the emergence of the previously-critiqued asserted relationship, and briefly reconstructs the connection between interpretation and
authority in a broader frame-emphasizing norms, decisionmaking, and
institutional factors. In fact the greatest significance of authority theories
for interpretive practice might be in modulating the strength of competing sources of law. In this way, authority theorizing might be redeemed.
A. Lessons
Dead hand complaints both remind us that positive law needs our
complicity to survive and demand a defense of the status quo. Authority
theories offer responses and they influence interpretation in an undeniable way: They select targets for a decisionmaker's interpretation by identifying what counts as law. To the extent an authority theory highlights
benefits from respecting some source of law-and not every theory has
this purpose-decisionmakers might prefer to avoid warring against
those benefits. But this suggests an additional normative commitment,
and, regardless, the logical relationship between authority theories and
interpretive method is vacillating and contingent. Assertions and conclusions about this relationship are summarized in Table 1 and reiterated
below.
254. See id. at 59, 75, 93, 105 (suggesting attitude of judicial humility).
255. See id. at 210-11.
256. See id. at 59, 212, 214 (discussing "[u] nsettlement theory's descriptive version").
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1

THE AUTHORITY/INTERPRETATION

RELATIONSHIP

FOR THE CONSTITUTION

Asserted relationship

Actual relationship

brute fact, oaths
good content

unspecified
suggests moral reading

none
opposite relationship;
no method suggested

practical authority,
CJT

suggests originalism

none applied to to
decision; weak theory
for t_1 decision

precommitment,
incentives

suggests originalism

weak theory

coordination

suggests
conventionalism
suggests common law

perhaps, but little
constraint
none, if another law
source

indeterminacy

perhaps, but little

Authority theory

tradition
unsetflement

I guarantee

constraint

First, positivist efforts to describe law without normative evaluation
have no apparent connection to any method of interpretation. 2 57 Such
brute fact theories cannot recommend the maintenance of what they define as law, let alone how it ought to be interpreted. These are, after all,
content-independent explanations of what law is and they should not be
expected to provide much guidance on the subtleties of interpretation.
Good content theories do aim for an assessment of the moral quality
of law's content and they can provide reasons for respecting it.2 58 When
the law's content is worse than perfect and better than awful, however,
the advice is not clear. Equally important, an informed assessment of the
Constitution demands some kind of interpretive presupposition. And
this means interpretation is driving authority, not the reverse. The situation might be different if a prior generation qualified as a practical authority or if the Condorcet Jury Theorem applied to their judgments.
The problem is that these theories fit poorly with the dated text-making
procedures that generated the Constitution.
For similar reasons, contractarian and incentive-based theories could
influence interpretive method if they worked with an ancient constitutional text.2 59 But application to the Constitution is at least controversial.
Precommitment requires individuals to conceptualize themselves as part
of a single generation of nation builders. Some will understandably resist
257. See supra Part III.B.1.
258. See supra Part III.B.2.
259. See supra Part III.B.3.
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this idea, which bears the risk of undue deference to past mistakes and
has trouble identifying an effective constraint that the same "self' imposes and obeys.
Stability theories do present sound reasons for continued, if qualified, respect for the status quo.2 60 Their conservative message complements good content theories by openly analyzing the foreseeable risks of
departure. On the other hand, the implications of stability theories for
interpretive method are limited. Even if they could advise conventional
readings of the Constitution, thus providing a side constraint or outer
boundary on permissible meaning, they do not provide a direction for
interpretation. An array of interpretive choices may reduce variance in
meaning without disrupting continued reliance on the document. Adhering to the asserted authority/interpretation relationship is even more
awkward when stability and good content theories are combined, as they
often are. 26 1 The former provides little guidance for interpretive
method, while the latter depends on the method selected.
A broader lesson recognizes the impact of normative frameworks.
Their role in decisionmaking undercuts the sequential rigidity of a general assertion that authority drives interpretation. For the assertion to be
convincing, values reflected in an interpretive method and attributed to
the dictates of a companion authority theory should not be, in fact, the
result of a third force. But at least for good content and stability theories,
there does seem to be a third force operating. An overarching normative
framework usefully accounts for the possible affiliation of these theories
with moral and conventional readings of the Constitution, respectively.
Certainly one can begin with a generic commitment such as egalitarianism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, or some other way of conducting normative evaluation, and then apply that commitment to authority theories
as well as interpretive method. 262 At some point the larger normative
questions are inescapable.
It would not be surprising, therefore, if theorists typically deploy a
relatively general normative framework both when they attempt tojustify
respect for the Constitution and when they recommend interpretations
of the document. This account fits well with a commitment to interpret
the written Constitution so that it is sufficiently good to deserve respect, 2 63 or to ordinarily read the text in a conventional fashion so as to
preserve its socially beneficial status as a focal point. 2 6 4 It is far less apparent what value there is in charting an analytic sequence in which an authority theory is specified at step one and then squeezed for interpretive
guidance at step two.
260. See supra Part III.B.4.
261. See supra note 135 (collecting sources).
262. I am referring to normative authority theories, not brute fact theories. The latter
are neither overtly normative nor do they have implications for interpretive method.
263. See supra Part III.B.2.
264. See supra Part III.B.4.
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Finally, the relationship of authority to interpretation might well
change over time. Newly ratified constitutions, newly enacted statutes,
newly promulgated regulations, and newly issued orders from superior
officers benefit from a different collection of authority theories. Dead
hand complaints weaken in the absence of substantial population shifts,
while social contractarian theories become more plausible. Near the
time of enactment or issuance, the basis for a text's authority might recommend incorporating some kind of originalist investigation to resolve
uncertainty in meaning. 2 65 There are, as I have emphasized, other considerations in designing a sound interpretive method-including considerations of feasibility and institutional role. But the bare logical implication of an authority theory for recent additions to positive law arguably
favors a version of interpretation that will respect the political resolution
achieved.
So perhaps our Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be interpreted differently from our First. And perhaps nations with young written constitutions ought to be originalists, while countries with more constitutional
history should rely less on these texts. 266 All else equal, recent regime
change argues for respecting the resulting political settlement with a minimum of creativity. Assuming the new regime should not be divided into
separate political communities, attempting to honor original understandings faithfully can be a technique for building trust and long-term cooperation-and it should come at a time when originalist interpretation is
most feasible. Such fidelity might amount to a brute fact of political reality. Of course, it may be too difficult to locate a point at which the logical
force of contractarian theories expire, or the proper rate at which their
force diminishes. In addition, historical investigation can be done poorly
by amateurs, romantics, and the impatient, and it will not always uncover
useful information. But the basic implication for interpretive method remains plausible.

265. See, e.g., Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 12, at 205 (referring to a form of
nonoriginalism in which the presumptive force of text and history is "defeasible over time
in the light of changing experiences and perceptions"); Michael C. Doff, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo.
L.J. 1765, 1820 (1997) (discussing "the diminishing utility of original meaning over time");
Richard Primus, When to Be an Originalist 35 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 94, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1021779
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (raising problem of when "an amendment ... is...
recent enough to command authority over us today by reason of its democratic
enactment"); Strauss, Jefferson's Principle, supra note 12, at 1752-54 (arguing that it may
be appropriate to start with originalist interpretation but to employ other methods as time
passes); see also Merrill, supra note 26, at 512 ("Over time, however, the original meaning
and the conventional meaning will often diverge, and when that happens the
conventionalist of course follows the conventional meaning ....
266. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 12, at 924.
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B. Explanations
If the authority/interpretation relationship is complex and variable,
one might wonder why simpler and more ambitious assertions are heard
in constitutional theory. Three possibilities are worth considering.
Some theorists actually make limited claims. Raz, who suggests the
combination of good content and stability theories for respecting the
Constitution, is an example. He warns that an authority theory is only
one factor in interpretive method and concludes that, once the competing considerations of stability and innovation are accounted for, there is
little constructive advice for constitutional interpretation "other than
'reason well' or 'interpret reasonably.' " 2 6 7 Now, there is a strong case for
adding interpretive rules to these vague directives. 268 The more important observation is that authority scholarship can be nuanced on the interpretation question and the nuance might be lost to the attraction of
plain and bold statements. This might be especially so for theories of
constitutional authority, which are intriguing in their own right.
A second explanation is the readily available analogue of statutory
interpretation. The logical influence of statutory authority theories on
methods of statutory interpretation could be significant. 269 When a court
attempts to resolve ambiguity in statutory meaning, it is not irrational to
recommend that the court play agent to the legislature's principal. This
might suggest a brand of originalist statutory interpretation rather than
moral or other readings, a conclusion reinforced if the legislature ought
to be treated as a practical authority. To be clear, this advice for statutory
interpretation is contested and limited. 270 One might decide to respect
the legislature by sticking to the statutory language and its supposedly
public meaning, for example, rather than investigating other legislative
history; it depends on what kind of respect is most appealing. Furthermore, there are feasibility questions to confront. Heidi Hurd reconsidered her authority theory for statutes after concluding that the intentoriented interpretive method it suggested was inappropriate or impossible. 27 1 Of more immediate concern is the problem of direct importation
into federal constitutional law. For many observers it has become difficult to equate ancient constitutional text with statutes that are younger or
at least easier to amend, or to view past generations like superior officers
2 72
who issued commands in tj that are entitled to respect at to.
267. Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 11, at 180.
268. See Samaha, Undue Process, supra note 19, at 614-20 (discussing decision costs
and error costs).
269. See supra Part II.C.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 127-128.
271. See Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, supra note 127, at 405-06, 418-24
(promoting theoretical authority for statutes, as in heuristic advice on moral conduct, and
separating it from intentionalist interpretation).
272. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 200-203.
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This second explanation for the asserted authority/interpretation relationship seems incomplete, however, and not only because many
Americans do identify with a unified national heritage. Moral readers,
common-law constitutionalists, and others have connected interpretive
method to an authority theory without accepting a command model of
constitutional law or the collapse of generations into "The American
People." More is at work than a contested analogy between statutory and
constitutional law.
A third explanation returns to concrete controversies: abortion policy, gun control, and the rest. 27 3 With the Supreme Court situated as an
important expositor of constitutional meaning, critics and admirers
sought new leverage in their debates. Legal scholars were not willing to
follow Monaghan and concede the issue of the Constitution's legal status
to political theorists. 274 At some point moral readers and originalists perceived a connection between the interpretive results to which they were
committed and an authority theory that they could accept. The former
could question the advantages and coherence of dead hand control while
advocating the possibility of a morally satisfying Constitution-if only it
were supplemented by an interpretive practice sensitive to our best rendering of the good. The latter could draw on popular affection for the
Founding generation, even if these feelings were not so potent among
intellectuals-and follow this respect from the foundation for the
Constitution as law to the interpretation of that same text. Common law
constitutionalists who accepted the text as worthy of some degree of respect developed their own response to the authority question. They
could solve the dead hand problem without automatic respect for
Founding-era decisions by tolerating the text as a focal point and one
source of wisdom-which gives the written Constitution a role in our law
while confronting the originalists' asserted authority/interpretation relationship on its own terms.
Originalists and others might have thought that shifting the conversation to a more general theoretical plane would help resolve urgent
questions in adjudication. If, for example, nonoriginalists would just admit that the written Constitution must be law and that the reason for its
status must drive interpretive method away from the innovations of Roe v.
Wade, more people might consult the good work of ratification and its
surrounding history. But the debates persisted, replicated at every level,
from theory to method to meaning.
It is tempting to end on this note, suggesting that the theoretical
assent to authority was a not particularly fruitful strategic effort to settle
ideologically riven controversies. Tempting because partly true. But not
all theoretical efforts have this strategic character. And it will be more
constructive to close with thoughts, however provisional, on how the con273. See supra Part I.A.
274. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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nection between authority theories and interpretive methods can be reconsidered within a broader frame.
C. Reconfiguration
Neither McConnell's nor Monaghan's message is quite correct.
Those who see authority theories as a separate exercise and the key to
interpretive method are overclaiming. Authority theories do identify law
and suggest overarching normative values, but an interpreter may take
those values into account regardless, and the rest of the authority/interpretation connection is complicated. Yet those who jettison the authority
inquiry from the proper domain of legal scholarship are losing something. Most important, authority theories are well placed to gauge the
relative strength of competing sources of law. This can have serious implications for the practice of constitutional interpretation and decisionmaking. Retaining for convenience the asserted relationship's deductive
character (recall Figure 1), we can reconfigure a defensible connection
between authority theories, interpretive methods, and other considerations left out by the assertion (Figure 2).275
FIGURE

2.

RECONFIGURED RELATIONSHIP (DEDUCTIVE VERSION)

275. For those who stress induction or reflective equilibrium, think of Figure 2 turned
upside down or repeatedly flipped. On influence diagrams, of which Figure 2 is a
simplified version, see Ross D. Shachter, Model Building with Belief Networks and
Influence Diagrams, in Advances in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to Applications
177 (Ward Edwards et al. eds., 2007).
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The first analytical advance follows what is becoming conventional
wisdom in the academy: the relevance to interpretation of overarching
normative frameworks and institutional factors. 276 The former provide
goals for conduct, and the latter are reminders that the particular occasion for interpretation matters. Goals are inevitable, whether highminded or self-centered. Awareness of institutional setting performs
complementary functions. Knowing that the relevant activity is, for instance, judicial adjudication or agency rulemaking refines the interpreter's goals. Each institution possesses comparative advantages on certain tasks but not others. The institutional location shapes appropriate
objectives for interpretation and links the relationship of the interpreter
to other actors in a dynamic way. Further, the institutional setting comes
with feasibility constraints. Along with more general limits on what decisionmakers can achieve, the institutional location grounds methodological choices in reality. Only certain information, resources, and effects will
be imaginable and obtainable.
This interaction of norms with institutions and their associated feasibility constraints leads to another revision. It is to change the end result
from "meaning" to "decision." The ultimate objective of the asserted relationship between authority theories and interpretive method is to yield
meaning from sources of law. Of course generating meaning from law is
valuable, but the healthy injection of normative goals and institutional
factors is a signal that this form of interpretation is rarely done for its own
sake. Legal interpretation produces information for a decision process
with consequences. The process affects participants, and its output is an
alteration of the status quo, even if only to confirm expectations. Textual
meaning is only one component of decisions, which are essential to insti277
tutions whether they regulate, legislate, adjudicate, or enforce law.
With this decision-oriented perspective, authority theories and interpretation can be reconnected. We already understand they may interact
with respect to a single text. For example, choosing an interpretive
method facilitates a normative evaluation of the Constitution's content.
But placing the activity of interpretation within an institution's process
for decision exposes another connection-the relative influence of multiple information sources.
Every decision process selects from an infinite number of information sources those that seem useful. And every decision process develops
some protocol for aggregating or reconciling relevant sources, even if
276. See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 18, at 4-5 (emphasizing institutional choice as
necessary for translating social goals into policy choices); supra notes 18, 114-115
(collecting sources).
277. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text (discussing literary theorists'
concentration on interpretation as search for authorial intent and lawyers' struggle to keep
term more flexible); cf. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes .. . and Constitutions, 85 Geo.
L.J. 1823, 1823-24 (1997) (seeking to segregate concept of interpretation and practice of
adjudication).
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that protocol is implicit.2 78 In working with multiple sources perceived as
discrete, decisionmakers assign and reassign relative strengths to these
sources during the process of reconciliation. These relative values move
the decisionmaking process forward. The processes we call adjudication,
legislation, regulation, and enforcement are no different in this respect.
Actors within those institutions have goals and agendas that are resolved
by collecting information, which often points toward conflicting outcomes. These data include case-specific facts and more general information, historical inquiry, and prediction of consequences. Another piece
of information is existing positive law, conventionally divided between supreme federal constitutional law and lower orders of authority. This distinction is pedestrian. After all, the written Constitution declares itself
"the supreme Law of the Land" in Article VI, and it has been persistently
accepted that the document trumps other sources in the case of
conflict.

279

The reality of legal decisionmaking is more complicated, however, or
at least open to a different approach. No document is supreme on its sayso, as the dead hand complaint reminds us. Asking why the written
Constitution is allowed to have force today can lead to a conclusion short
of wholehearted endorsement yet more respectful than complete rejection. 280 The Constitution's authority, its legitimacy, and anyone's obligation to respect it can be variables with multiple gradations. A time can be
imagined when the brute forces of social acceptance wane without disappearing. Contractarian and Condorcetian theories have already weakened with time, the goodness of the text varies with one's normative
framework in addition to interpretive method, and stability arguments
are only one consideration in the decision to abide. Concluding that the
written Constitution is weakly authoritative, in the sense that there should
be serious doubt about the propriety of enforcing it to the hilt, is entirely
plausible depending on one's values. If the document's authority may be
278. See, e.g., William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Horgarth, Judgment and Decision
Research: Some Historical Context, in Research on Judgment and Decision Making:
Currents, Connections, and Controversies 3, 3-34 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M.
Horgarth eds., 1997) (canvassing developments in expected utility theory and behavioral
psychology); Ronald A. Howard, The Foundations of Decision Analysis Revisited, in
Advances in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to Applications, supra note 275, at 32,
34-39 (building prescriptive rationalist model for decisions); Irving Tallman & Louis N.
Gray, Choices, Decisions, and Problem-Solving, 16 Ann. Rev. Soc. 405, 425-27 (1990)
(discussing spontaneous and deliberative choice and links to social setting); see also
Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 141-43 (3d ed. 2000) (describing problematic
availability heuristics); Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, supra note 18, at 175-81
(reviewing decision strategies for uncertainty, such as maximin, satisficing, and heuristics).
279. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
280. Richard Fallon helpfully identifies gradations in sociological legitimacy and
accepts this possibility for moral legitimacy, but he questions the value of moral legitimacy
theories that are intermediate between minimal and ideal. See Fallon, supra note 97, at
1796, 1798-99 & n.36. He also concludes that it would conflate empirical and normative
matters to combine his notions of legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy. See id. at 1851.
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judged with a scale instead of a switch, then its strength as a source of law
need not match the bravado of Article VI.
Assigning the written Constitution something less than its declared
strength might have troubling consequences, at least if done transparently, and doing so less publicly is fraught with other moral risks. But
before the thought is rejected, we should understand that softening the
Constitution's potency as a source of law can have at least two effects.
The first effect might be to multiply the sources of supreme constitutional law. Many academics believe such additional sources already exist-for example, judicial decisions denominated constitutional and arrived at through common law reasoning. 28 ' Others have made sustained
efforts to expand our operative canon of constitutional law beyond the
document and case law.28 2 There is also an analogy to theories that
28 3
soften the distinction between the Constitution and favored statutes.
It is likewise possible to view recent discussion about the proper role of
foreign law in U.S. constitutional adjudication as an extension of the effort to add sources. Although the argument for foreign sources may be
couched as a supplement to interpretation of domestic constitutional
text,28 4 these sources might be used as evidence of a universal normative
truth. And, as I have indicated, the line between a new source of constitu28 5
tional law and a resource for interpretation is easy to cross anyway.
Each of these candidates for supreme or fundamental law might be
unacceptable or frightening, especially if arbitrated through judicial review. But these fears might be grounds to maintain the supreme strength
of the written Constitution rather than to deny the possible consequences
of moderating that strength. The consequences are perhaps the best rea281. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1127, 1127-28 (1987) (making historical argument favoring "multiple sources of
fundamental law"); supra note 110 (collecting sources).
282. See supra notes 48, 112 (discussing Bruce Ackerman's constitutional moments);
cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
963, 1014-18 (1998) (concentrating on canon revision in legal academia).

283. See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 10, at 1781-82, 1806-07
(reviewing race-based civil rights legislation and emphasizing role of lawyers in defending
these past victories); William N. Eskridge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J.
1215, 1216, 1275-76 (2001) (discussing statutes that "over time . . . 'stick' in the public
culture such that ...the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a
broad effect on the law"); Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the "Statutory Constitution,"
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1993, at 243, 244 & n.3, 252, 269 (exploring statutes such
as Voting Rights Act of 1965 that "may lay claim to expressing our fundamental law in a way
that entitles them to be included within the range of material relevant to constitutional
interpretation"); cf. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 913-16, 956-76 (2006) (using
nonjudicial platforms to enable information access claims, but conditioned on
freestanding constitutional norm that is otherwise difficult to implement).
284. See, e.g., Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 119, at 1228
(offering "a more systematic approach to ...learning from constitutional experience
elsewhere" in a way that might "contribute to interpreting the U.S. Constitution").
285. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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sons for matching the Constitution's cultural status with a supreme legal
status, even if no concrete interpretive method for the document will
follow.
The second possible effect is related yet distinct. It involves the relative strength of supposedly lower order domestic law. Strength can matter
even if the Constitution is the sole candidate for supreme law. If that text
is weakly authoritative, then admittedly nonsupreme sources of law could
receive correspondingly greater influence in decisionmaking. The occasions on which interpreted constitutional text trumps other sources of
law would be reduced or eliminated. Contrast the first effect of moderating the Constitution's strength, which raises qualms about too many
sources of constitutional law overriding the work of present-day officials.
Here the entire notion of a supreme law is eroding. Other sources of
supposedly ordinary legal authority-federal statutes, regulations, executive decisions-presumably rise in relative importance across the board.
The result is akin to Thayer's hope forjudicial deference to the judg286
ments of other decisionmakers when constitutional concerns arise.
But it is conceptually more radical. Diminished in strength, the
Constitution would have less hold on nonjudicial actors who otherwise
would have retained a duty to make their own inquiry into constitutional
meaning. Constitutional judicial review would subside in overt form, but
so would review by any other institution.
The net effect need not be severe, however. A combination of authority theories might nudge the written Constitution above some other
sources in strength. Plus, path dependence, the inertia of legal culture,
and contemporary judgments in the face of uncertainty might leave the
document and even judicial influence fairly secure. Recall the history of
vacillation between bicameral and unicameral legislatures in places where
28 7
formal constitutional amendment is easier: There is none.
No doubt these potential effects are unacceptable to many, and I am
not endorsing either. Adding the dimension of strength to the authority
question is meant to establish a practical connection between authority
theories and constitutional interpretation within a decision context-a
connection more revealing than the asserted unidirectional relationship
from authority to interpretation for particular sources. In some ways the
connection is unfortunate. It brings with it the possibility of inserting the
deep question of the written Constitution's authoritative strength into the
workaday job of interpretation. The issue, moreover, is not one for which
the conventional lawyer enjoys a clear advantage in knowledge or judgment. But it appears that a sound analytical picture of interpretation and
decision is incomplete without this relationship to the authority inquiry.
Who ought to conduct the inquiry is another question.
286. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 144 (claiming that courts had traditionally
demanded clear constitutional violations before contradicting judgments of coordinate
branches of government).
287. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

For us and for now, the written Constitution is an invincible icon and
enforceable law. But the relationship between theories for its authority
and methods of its interpretation is not yet understood. Many scholars
have asserted that the former importantly influences the latter, in the
sense that particular authority theories are logically linked to particular
interpretive methods. The truth is complicated. In some instances the
arrow of influence runs from interpretive method back to an authority
theory. In others there is no strong influence in any direction. In still
others an authority theory ought to influence interpretive method, but
the theory itself is implausible, or at least controversial.
A more useful picture of the authority/interpretation connection
makes decision the central concern, and it understands the interpretation of law as simply one source of information. "Meaning" is not the
ultimate goal. From this perspective, the practice of interpretation can
be reconnected to authority theories. Authority theories identify targets
for interpretation in legal decisionmaking, they may reflect overarching
normative values that independently influence interpretation, and they
can graduate the strength of competing sources of law in a way that affects decisions in institutions. This last influence might be problematic
for conventional lawyers andjudges. But for a rigorous analysis of constitutional interpretation and decision, a contested question of authority
seems unavoidable: To what extent should people restrict their judgment
about law in accord with the imperfect decisions of the past, when the
past no longer governs?
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